Over the last several years, countries including the U.S., UK, Turkey, Hungary, Poland, and Spain have witnessed the rise of authoritarian leaders and the return of politicians posing as defenders of the “will of the people.” Right-wing populism is back in fashion worldwide, but the reasons for its ascension aren’t the same everywhere. In the Global South, Brazil and the Philippines have elected national populist presidents and offer an opportunity to understand the development of such trends in different social and economic backdrops.
In their 2018 book, National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin analyze two political episodes in 2016 that were propelled by national populist movements: the election of Donald Trump in the United States and the United Kingdom’s “Brexit” referendum about leaving the European Union. The authors lay out four elements—the “four Ds”—intrinsic to the emergence of national populism that were evident in both episodes: the electorate’s distrust of politicians and institutions; fears about the potential destruction of national identity and ways of life; a sense of economic deprivation relative to other societal groups; and the dealignment between voters and mainstream parties.
These trends set the stage for rising populism and having them as parameters helps identify what populist movements across the globe have in common and what sets them apart. And far from being limited to countries like the U.S. or UK, these historic shifts are also found in contemporary Brazil and the Philippines. The way Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and his Filipino counterpart Rodrigo Duterte operate bears many similarities to right-wing populists in the Global North. However, the distinct socio-economic backdrop they are embedded in necessitates adaptations to the populist playbook.
The fact that immigration—which fuels much populist anger in the U.S. and Western Europe—is not a major concern in Brazil or the Philippines, for instance, means that Bolsonaro and Duterte must tap other concerns to amass popular support. And as two young democracies that emerged from dictatorships in the 1980s, with comparatively weaker institutions, these two populist leaders have implemented policies with more sinister results, from the arrest of journalists to the political persecution of members of the judiciary to mass police killings.
To understand the phenomena that boosted Duterte and Bolsonaro to power—and which may elevate other right-wing populists in developing countries—it’s paramount to analyze how they fit into the global populism puzzle.
There are many reasons for the global disconnect between nations’ political establishments and their electorates. Among them, Eatwell and Goodwin note, are the higher levels of education and income that separate politicians from their voters. Those disparities are exponentially higher in the Global South. In Brazil, a member of Congress earns 32 times the minimum wage. Considering stipends for housing, clothing, trips, and staffing, that difference increases eightfold, making Brazil’s Congress the second-most expensive globally—trailing only the U.S.—with each federal legislator costing U.S. $7.4 million annually. Despite this, the quality of public services lags far behind those in developed economies, fueling the public’s reproach of the political establishment.
Endemic corruption, which is also more acute in the Global South, has also nurtured popular distrust towards mainstream politics. Although individual malfeasance has been a perennial problem in Brazil, an onslaught of scandals involving prominent businessmen, bureaucrats, and politicians has outraged the public for the past six years. What started as a money-laundering probe in 2014 involving petrol stations and car washes morphed into one of the biggest anti-corruption operation in the world. The continuing Federal Police investigation, known as “Car Wash,” has requested information from 61 countries and has so far traced trillions of dollars in transactions related to bribery schemes. It’s little wonder that, according to a recent World Economic Forum survey of 137 countries, Brazilian citizens trust their politicians the least.
Similarly, the Philippines consistently ranks poorly in global corruption perception surveys. The nation has one of the highest income tax rates in Asia but its social services and healthcare system leave much to be desired. In recent years, traffic in the capital city of Manila has so deteriorated that it became a focus of the 2016 presidential election, mirroring the public’s clamor for improvements in public transportation and infrastructure.
Against the backdrop of unpopular political elites, populists can find their way to power by posing as outsiders in their rhetoric. Like populists elsewhere, Duterte’s and Bolsonaro’s firebrand discourse have helped shape their image as unorthodox candidates who can overhaul corrupt, oligarchic regimes and give voice to the public’s aspirations.
In Brazil, Bolsonaro won the presidency in 2018 by running as an outsider, despite having served seven terms as a congressman. Over his 28 years in office and in the lead-up to his campaign, he praised the military dictatorship that ruled the country from 1964 to 1985, expressed support for torture, and argued that police officers should not always be prosecuted for civilian deaths during law enforcement operations. 
Among his most controversial statements, the retired army captain simulated machine-gunning his opponents; suggested that a community of Black Brazilians, who are descended from enslaved people, were livestock; said that Indigenous people have no culture and are “increasingly becoming human beings”; told a congresswoman she didn’t “deserve” to be raped; and declared himself a proud homophobe who would rather any son of his be dead than gay.
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s leap into politics also came on the heels of dictatorship in the mid-1980s, when he was appointed vice-mayor of Davao City, and sought to clean the streets of systemic corruption and criminals linked to the illegal drug trade. His campaign for the presidency 30 years later, on an anti-crime and -corruption platform, was similarly colored by curveball remarks, with Duterte joking about raping a missionary and riding a jet-ski to the South China Sea to defend sovereignty, and boasting about riding a motorcycle and shooting criminal suspects dead. In 2016, he was elected to a six-year term with 39 percent, or 16 million votes, shocking the global political arena.
Duterte’s rhetoric resonated deeply among the country’s newly rising middle class, which saw in his braggadocio, sleazy jokes, and brutal frankness, one of their own. “His populism is more street-type,” said political analyst Ramon Casiple, executive director of the Manila-based advocacy group Institute for Political and Electoral Reform. “He thinks like the man on the street. That’s the mayor in him…He can make a statement today and the next day set it aside; he doesn’t want to be predictable.”
Political analysts in Brazil point out that Bolsonaro’s campaign had a similar strategy. From seemingly improvised live broadcasts on social media to wearing casual attire to formal events, he strived to appear like an average Brazilian, whom voters could identify with.
Power in the Philippines has been concentrated within the executive branch since the collapse of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986. “We’ve come to a situation where every politician wants to be the president. Nothing else. Not even vice-president, not even senator,” Casiple noted. “Because the money and the power is with the president.”
The president has the final say in budgetary matters, is capable of using bureaucratic technicalities to oust chief justices—as Duterte and his predecessor Benigno Aquino III, both did—and has the means to go after dissidents within government. Institutions forced to act as referees, like the Supreme Court, end up in the crossfire of polarized political battles, further undermining democratic values.
“Lawfare,” or the use of the legal apparatus in political disputes, is also on the rise in Brazil, as the number of challenges to Bolsonaro’s decrees and decisions brought before the Supreme Court has reached record levels. The increasing involvement of the judiciary in political affairs, a trend that has been going on for years, upsets the balance between the three branches of government. In one of his latest controversies, in March 2020, Bolsonaro called on the public to attend street demonstrations against the Supreme Court and the Congress, and in favor of his administration. (He eventually backtracked due to concerns of mass gatherings amid the coronavirus outbreak but later attended the demonstration and took pictures with supporters.)
Such direct attacks on democratic institutions connect Bolsonaro and Duterte to other world leaders among the global Right, including U.S. President Donald Trump, French far-right leader Marine Le Pen, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. All five use the free press as a punching bag and sow distrust towards journalism, another pillar of liberal democracies.
In September 2019, Bolsonaro mimicked Donald Trump in labeling mainstream media “the enemy.” That October, also following a move by his American counterpart, Bolsonaro picked a fight with national newspaper Folha de S.Paulo, announcing the cancellation of government subscriptions. He later retreated amid backlash from civil society organizations and a lawsuit charging that the move was unconstitutional. Bolsonaro has since directly attacked the paper’s reporters and barred them from covering events he attended. In 2019, the press was attacked 11,000 times per day on Brazilian social media, according to a study on threats to freedom of expression by the Brazilian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters.
In the Philippines, government-backed tax violation and cyber-libel lawsuits against journalist Maria Ressa and Philippine news website Rappler, as well as threats to not renew a Philippine TV network’s operating license, exemplify Duterte’s repression of an independent press. The worst incident to date was the 2019 arrest of Ressa, Rappler’s Executive Editor, for cyber-libel, among other charges. In 2019, the Freedom for Media, Freedom for All Network found that Filipino journalists faced at least 154 incidents of attacks and personal threats since Duterte’s election.
On top of these obvious attacks on the free press, both Duterte and Bolsonaro resorted to well-structured social media operations that spread misinformation and heightened public distrust of the media by labeling factual journalism as fake news.
Bolsonaro’s election bid was boosted by a Whatsapp social media campaign wherein public relations agencies—illegally paid for by right-wing businessmen—spread misinformation to millions of people online, as reporting by Folha de S.Paulo revealed, and multiple subsequent studies and analyses confirmed.
Duterte used Facebook in a similar fashion. According to a 2016 investigation by Rappler, in the lead up to the Philippines 2016 election, Duterte’s campaign paid trolls to spread misinformation and amplify their message. The campaign later admitted the practice and acknowledged they continued with the operation months after Duterte’s election, to influence public opinion and strengthen support for his agenda.
Cambridge Analytica, the now-defunct British political consulting firm implicated in both Russia’s meddling in the U.S. 2016 election and for harvesting political data from millions of Facebook users, has conceded that it used Duterte’s social media strategy as a blueprint for Donald Trump’s 2016 U.S. presidential campaign.
In the Global North, populists have prospered by playing to people’s perception that their way of living and national identity are threatened by newcomers from abroad. Inciting anti-immigration sentiment among portions of the middle class hurt by globalization is leveraging what Eatwell and Goodwin describe as the sentiment of destruction among voters.
As immigration is not a major political issue in the Global South, populists there have had to adapt this strategy. They urge radical solutions to longstanding social ills, like crime and drug dealing, to appeal to a public fatigued by traditional politics that have failed to solve such problems. Arguing that the population is currently worse off than in the past, Bolsonaro praises the military regime by claiming that there was less corruption, more economic prosperity, and safer streets back then. These are all questionable arguments, but by tailoring populist tactics to the local reality, he evokes a sense of destruction of an idealized past among his voters.
Bolsonaro has also pledged to govern in favor of a so-called traditionalist majority, in a reference to his mostly White, rich, socially conservative, Christian support base. When he says that in Brazil “minorities have to bend down to the majority,” he is pointing fingers at Left/liberal social movements in favor of gender equality, LGBTQ rights, affirmative actions for Black communities, and the protection of Indigenous populations. Instead of scapegoating immigrants, Bolsonaro’s implicit argument is that feminists, human rights activists, and non-governmental organizations are threatening the idealized national identity he pledges to protect.
In both Brazil and the Philippines, rising violence, crime, or drug use had inspired generally unsuccessful promises of change from previous federal and local governments, prior to Bolsonaro and Duterte. Some of the problems are real. In 2017, for example, Brazil recorded 63,880 murders—a rate of violent deaths six times higher than that of the United States.
Some of the problems, on the other hand, are exaggerated. Duterte’s campaign leveraged Filipinos’ fears that crime and drug use were rampant, and exacerbated those concerns by inflating data for drug addiction in the Philippines—classifying people who admitted to using drugs just once as “addicts.” Relying on inflated statistics, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency suggested that 92 percent of Metro Manila’s villages had a drug problem; Duterte promised that if he won, “change [was] coming.”
In these ways, both politicians argued that a safe and orderly way of life was under threat, in order to crystallize support nationwide. Filipino scholar and political analyst Richard Heydarian describes Duterte’s base as Filipino workers from the emerging middle class, including many in the business outsourcing sector, who have worked in the Middle East and Gulf regions to support families back home. As members of this new middle class reach better living standards, argues political science scholar Arjan Aguirre, they place greater value on disposable goods—a tangible proxy for their improved way of life—and become more impulsive, paranoid, and fearful of petty crimes. The prospect of criminals or drug addicts looking for money appears as a threat to not just their property, but their precarious new status.
“The mindset of the new middle class is different,” said Aguirre. “Because they own disposable material goods [now], they have fear of theft, robbery, being laid off.” Duterte’s presidential run tapped into this wellspring of fear, economic insecurity, and instability.
The economy also plays a role in the populist agenda, which plays out in distinct ways in developed and developing countries. Heydarian argues that the current political scenarios in Brazil and the Philippines can be described as “emerging market populism,” as they have different causes than those in more mature democracies and operate in institutional environments with comparatively fewer checks and balances.
In societies where inequality proliferates, the middle class grew frustrated with policies favoring the poor over their interests. In Brazil, socioeconomic improvements achieved in the 2000s stagnated in the following decade, then plunged, between 2014 and 2016, as the country faced one of the worst recessions in its history, sending 4.5 million people back into poverty and fomenting social unrest. Approval ratings for sitting politicians cratered, creating a void ready to be filled.
Bolsonaro spoke to a society hurt by economic decline and spiking unemployment. The sense of relative economic deprivation was disseminated in ways similar to those in the U.S. and the UK, where neoliberal policies led to increasing levels of income and wealth concentration, as Eatwell and Goodwin argue. In Brazil, affirmative action developments in the 2000s, both for Black students entering federal universities and in new income redistribution programs aimed at elevating the nation’s low-income population, generated resentment among the middle class, which believed it was being squeezed as the poor rose from misery but their own road to the upper class was not clear.
In the economic downturn of the mid-2010s, many saw their living conditions actually deteriorate. The share of Brazilians living on less than US $1.9 per day increased from 4.5 percent in 2014 to a record high of 6.5 percent in 2018, according to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics.
Likewise, despite the Philippines being one the fastest-growing economies in Asia, average Filipinos face shabby living standards, widespread corruption, and bureaucratic red tape. The country consistently ranks poorly among nations in terms of starting businesses, acquiring credit and enforcing contracts, according to the World Bank Doing Business report. The failure of political elites to provide quality social services, safer streets, or to meet the demands of those lifted out of poverty led many to begin doubting the efficiency of the political system as a whole, and to consider trying something different, Heydarian notes.
The fourth element that has opened the doors of Western democracies to national populists is the weakening of bonds between the electorate and traditional parties. The notion of dealignment, however, does not follow suit in the Brazilian and Filipino cases.
In contrast to the bipartisan model of the United States, or fairly defined political groups in Western Europe (such as conservatives, greens and social democrats), Brazil has 33 existing political parties, with 77 others in the process of being formed. Bolsonaro himself has been a member of eight political parties and has recently proposed a new one.
The Philippines plays host to countless political parties, party-lists, and turncoat politicians whenever elections draw near. Duterte has switched political colors when it benefited him, abandoning his predecessor’s party for a coalition composed of cronies and traditional politicians. His new party’s name (Hugpong ng Pagbabago) crudely translates as “Coalition for Change,” signaling a supposed divergence from so-called dirty politics that often characterize the country’s elections. This move is nothing new for Filipinos, since this electioneering has been around since the country gained independence from Spanish rule 121 years ago. Coalitions between political parties are common in election season but either dissolve or become fixtures in the political landscape.
“In the Philippines and also in Brazil, you don’t have party politics, like Democrats versus Republicans,” Heydarian said. “There are times when a new leader comes in, with fresh ideas—even possibly deadly [ideas]—and a majority of society is willing to give them a chance and say, ‘Well, the problems are so complicated that this guy may need two, three years of carte blanche and then let’s see if what he did was right or wrong.”
“Bolsonaro, very similarly to Duterte,” he added, “kind of sees violence as a cathartic solution.”
Shoot to Kill
In both societies, polarizing rhetoric, amplified by social media echo chambers, led to further divisions. It also paved the way for the political leaders to introduce unorthodox policies in the absence of strong checks and balances. Police violence has escalated in Brazil while Duterte’s bloody inquisition to curb the illegal drug trade has killed thousands of Filipinos, mostly urban poor. Heydarian labels this facet of populist movements in the Global South as “penal populism,” a topic he addresses alongside the role of human rights in the age of strongmen in a book edited by Harvard Law School’s Gerald Neuman.
Duterte’s election has been described as the end of post-Marcos Philippine politics—a period marked by liberal reforms prioritizing civil liberties and good governance. “Dutertismo,” as the president’s leadership style and socioeconomic policies are known, runs in the opposite direction. His drug war is a critical example. In many speeches, Duterte labeled the illegal drug trade the source of the Philippines’ problems. His crackdown employed the “Tokhang” method, a portmanteau of the Filipino words for “knock” and “plead.” Police would go around villages and urban-poor communities, knocking on households and asking suspected users and pushers to turn themselves in, leading to arrests, surrenders, and village watch-lists.
Widespread killings resulted, horrifying Filipinos as news reports described corpses littering the roadside, but rationalized the violence because the victims were drug addicts. Police killed suspected drug dealers and users in firefights, later claiming they had to fight back despite reports that many suspects did not own, and couldn’t afford guns, as well as allegations of crime scene tampering. Far more were killed in extrajudicial killings—a term that became common in the Philippines—committed by masked vigilantes on motorcycles who left mutilated bodies behind in the streets.
The initial death toll—nearly 1,800 in the first seven weeks—prompted global headlines and international condemnation. Human rights groups have since tallied the number of extrajudicial killings between 20,000 and 29,000 lives since 2016. Official government numbers are far lower, at around 5,000, according to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.
Ironically, for a politician who professes to be vehemently against drug addiction, Duterte has admitted to using fentanyl for pain management and marijuana to stay awake. Less surprising is that the drug war’s brutality morphed into a campaign against the country’s urban poor. The controversial shoot-to-kill policy that millions of Filipinos voted for resulted in scores of their neighbors being gunned down, as most of the dead are users, street dealers, and middlemen, not the bigwigs directing illegal operations.
Stronger institutions than those in the Philippines may have prevented Brazil from going down a similar path, for now. Although violence is endemic and heavily-armed drug dealers control large slums in the country’s cities, Brazilian gun laws are far stricter than those in the U.S. For a citizen to buy and have a gun at home, an authorization from the Federal Police is mandatory. Prospective gun owners must be over 25, have no criminal record and demonstrate technical and psychological conditions to use a firearm. Such a license needs to be renewed every three years.
Bolsonaro campaigned on a platform of relaxing such rules and also reducing police liability for civilian deaths, presenting both ideas as solutions to Brazil’s widespread public security issues. In 2015, he declared that “armed citizens are a country’s first line of defense.”
His words turned into action in May 2019, when he extended the right to bear arms to members of 20 different professions, including politicians, truck drivers, lawyers, farmers while on their properties, and journalists covering the police beat. Bolsonaro withdrew that decree after pushback from Congress and the Supreme Court, but shortly issued three new decrees that loosened the requirements for civilians to buy guns and keep them at home.
Bolsonaro has resorted to social media to incite his supporters to press legislators on the matter. In December 2019 he wrote that firearms registrations had increased by 50 percent while the number of deaths fell 22 percent, mocking “experts’” warnings that the opposite would happen. At the time, the most recent data compiled by G1’s Violence Monitor in partnership with the Brazilian Forum of Public Safety and the University of São Paulo’s Center for the Study of Violence indicated a 22 percent yearly reduction in violent deaths from January to September 2019.
What Bolsonaro did not mention was that police killings are on the rise. The most recent data shows that police officers committed more than 10 percent of Brazil’s total homicides recorded in the last year. In 2018, young Black boys and men overwhelmingly represented the victims of police brutality in Brazil.
Shades of Populism
Although Bolsonaro and Duterte bear many similarities, there are also stark differences in their policies, especially when it comes to social issues.
The Brazilian president campaigned on a conservative social agenda. Backed by Christian evangelicals, who have built a strong caucus in the Brazilian Congress over the past two decades, Bolsonaro pledged to defend “traditional family values,” fight so-called “gender ideology,” and put an end to alleged left-wing indoctrination at the country’s schools. He has pledged, for instance, to root out the influence of Brazil’s most famous educator, Paulo Freire.
Brazil’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, among the most ideological hard-liners in Bolsonaro’s cabinet, has claimed global warming is a Marxist plot, labeled Nazism a left-wing movement, and “denounced the United Nations and other so-called globalist forces for attempting to supplant true nationalism.” Bolsonaro has similarly challenged scientific data about the Amazon fires, and, without any evidence, claimed that NGOs and Hollywood actor Leonardo DiCaprio were responsible for destroying the rainforest.
In comparison, in the Philippines, Duterte has sometimes embraced progressive positions on LGBTQ rights, but has flip-flopped over the years. At the start of his term, he appointed members of the Left to head the departments of social welfare, agrarian reform, and the anti-poverty commission. Months later, Duterte’s allies in Congress rejected the appointments, but continued the government’s cash handouts to the neediest. Unlike his Brazilian counterpart, Duterte believes that more action is warranted against climate change since developing countries bear the brunt of the devastation.
Additionally, Duterte enjoys popular support. His approval ratings have soared between 70-85 percent in his first three years. Despite his veneer of progressivism on a limited range of issues, he has also shown that he is anti-abortion, supports the return of the death penalty for drug-related crimes, embraces crony capitalism, and is deeply misogynistic. For Aguirre and Casiple, Duterte is neither Right nor Left, but rather “the product of the emergence of new conditions,” as Aguirre explains. “We produced him; the frustrations of the people made him.”
This stands in sharp contrast to Brazil, where Bolsonaro’s approval rating dropped to 29 percent in December 2019, down from 35 percent in April. His disapproval rate increased from 27 percent to 38 percent over the same period.
In mid-March 2020, Brazilians quarantined amid the coronavirus crisis banged pots from windows and balconies on several consecutive nights to protest Bolsonaro’s downplaying the pandemic risks and his refusal to implement social distancing measures nationwide. In the Philippines, citizens took to social media to condemn preferential COVID-19 testing for the political elite, the lack of mass testing for the public, and the messy logistics of Duterte’s lockdown of the country’s most populous island.
The most obvious reaction to the increasingly challenging scenario Bolsonaro is likely to face, as rifts with Congress multiply and the economy underperforms, came in early March 2020. Bolsonaro claimed to have evidence of fraud in the 2018 election and that he should have been elected in the first round vote. Again playing to public distrust of institutions, he challenged journalists to find “one Brazilian who trusts the electoral system.” He has not revealed proof of his claims since.
Political analysts warned that such an alarming statement indicates that by questioning the legitimacy of the voting system, Bolsonaro is preemptively seeding doubts about the next election, in 2022, which suggests he might not willingly relinquish power if he is not reelected.
Duterte is not eligible for reelection after his six-year term ends in 2022. But the risk that he might also flout the rules concerns Heydarian. “In countries like the Philippines, Turkey, India, or Indonesia, once you have an authoritarian populist in power, as long as the military is not against them, they’ll have an easy time railroading their way to consolidations of power,” he said. In the Philippines, where institutions are vulnerable, the country could be flirting with a transition to an even more authoritarian dictatorship.
Democratic rupture is one of the most serious potential consequences of populist movements in the Global South. However, even if both leaders honor the law, and allow for a peaceful transition of power, their policies will have long-lasting effects on Brazilian and Filipino societies.
The same base that elected Duterte has since brought Philippine politics to its knees by wiping out opposition candidates for the senate and congress. The supermajority Duterte’s party now commands means that even after his term ends, his vice grip on the legislative branch and judiciary may remain in place.
The normalization of polarizing rhetoric has not only affected public discourse but has contaminated local politics in Brazil. State governors of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo elected in 2018 joined Bolsonaro’s radical law-and-order platform, although they are not political allies and have plans to run for the presidency in the next election themselves. Right-wing social conservative candidates from police, military, and religious backgrounds also won seats in state and federal legislative houses. That suggests that even after he leaves the presidential Palácio do Planalto, Bolsonaro’s populist agenda will remain ingrained in the country’s political fabric, potentially threatening long-term prospects for democracy.
Support for democratic ideals fell during Bolsonaro’s first year in office. The share of Brazilians who agreed that democracy is the best form of government declined from 69 percent in 2018 to 62 percent in 2019, while 22 percent said they are indifferent to whether the government remains democratic or becomes a dictatorship, up from 13 percent a year before.
In a broader sense, when emerging market countries leap to right-wing populism backed by social conservative forces, they also help reshape the international community. Brazilian delegations to the UN have campaigned to veto the use of the word “gender” in multiple resolutions, shocking Western countries but joining the likes of Russia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Bahrain.
Brazil also joined the U.S., Poland, and Lebanon at the 2nd International Conference on Christian Persecution, hosted by Viktor Orbán in Budapest in November 2019, marking a stark shift from the country’s foreign policy tradition of multilateralism. And Bolsonaro’s son Eduardo, who chairs the Brazilian Senate’s Commission on Foreign Affairs and National Defense, has been named the South American ambassador for Steve Bannon’s far-right group The Movement.
Operating similarly as populist leaders of the Global North and adapting the populist playbook for their local contexts, Bolsonaro and Duterte have shown that radical policies are enactable, attacks on institutions can be normalized, and democracy enjoys no guarantees of protection. Given that similar trends may affect the other countries in the Global South, recognizing developing world populism has become a vital piece of understanding the populist Right’s global expansion.
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 “More Millennials Voted for Duterte, Exit Poll Shows,” ABS-CBN News, May 14, 2016, https://news.abs-cbn.com/halalan2016/focus/05/14/16/more-millennials-vo….
 RG Cruz, “Why Duterte Is Popular among Wealthy, Middle Class Voters,” ABS-CBN News, May 1, 2016, https://news.abs-cbn.com/halalan2016/focus/04/30/16/why-duterte-is-popu…; Carmen N. Pedrosa, “Why Do Filipinos Continue to Support Duterte?” The Philippine Star, November 30, 2019, https://www.philstar.com/opinion/2019/12/01/1973187/why-do-filipinos-co….
 Ramon Casiple, interviewed by Ramon H. Royandoyan, December 28, 2019.
 Marco Rodrigo Almeida, “Para Especialistas, Bolsonaro Adota Visual Simples Como Tática,” Folha de S.Paulo, November 12, 2018, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/11/para-especialistas-bolsonar….
 Eric Pace, Eric, “THE FALL OF MARCOS: TWO DECADES AS PHILIPPINE CHIEF; THE MARCOS YEARS: FROM VOW TO ‘MAKE COUNTRY GREAT’ TO THE PUBLIC REVOLT,” New York Times, February 26, 1986, https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/26/world/fall-marcos-two-decades-philippine-chief-marcos-years-vow-make-country-great.html; Michael Henry Li and Yusingco, “’Imperial Manila’ Is a Constitutional Design: Towards Configuring Executive Authority in a Federal System,” ConstitutionNet, March 20, 2018, http://constitutionnet.org/news/imperial-manila-constitutional-design-t….
 Ramon Casiple, interviewed by Ramon H. Royandoyan on December 28, 2019.
 “Philippine Chief Justice Sereno, Duterte’s Critic, Removed,” Aljazeera, May 11, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/philippine-chief-justice-sereno-….
 Floyd Whaley, “Philippine Chief Justice Removed Over Omission in Report on Assets,” New York Times, May 29, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/world/asia/philippines-chief-justice….
 Ana P Santos, “ ‘Those charges are bulls**t’: Philippines jailed de Lima defiant,” Aljazeera, January 20, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/charges-bullst-philippines-jailed-de-lima-defiant-200120061152430.html.
 Michael Scharf and Elizabeth Andersen, “Is Lawfare Worth Defining - Report of the Cleveland Experts Meeting - September 11, 2010.” Case Western Reserve, J. Int’l L. 43 (2010): 11, https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol43/iss1/2/.
 Mariana Oliveira, Fernanda Vivas, and Rosanne D’Agostino, “Bolsonaro é Presidente Com Mais Decretos e MPs Questionados No STF No Primeiro Ano De Mandato,” G1, March 1, 2020, https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/03/01/bolsonaro-e-presidente….
 Amandino Teixeira Nunes Junior, A Judicialização da Política no Brasil: os Casos das Comissões Parlamentares de Inquérito e da Fidelidade Partidária (Brasília: Edições Câmara), 2016, https://livraria.camara.leg.br/a-judicializacao-da-politica-no-brasil-os-casos-das-comissoes-parlamentares-de-inquerito-e-da-fidelidade-partidaria.
 Euan Marshall, “Brazil President Jair Bolsonaro Ignores Coronavirus Warnings to Take Selfies with Demonstrators,” The Telegraph, March 16, 2020, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/03/16/brazil-president-jairbolson….
 “Bolsonaro Diz Que Parte Da ‘Grande Imprensa’ é Inimiga,” Folha de S.Paulo, September 13, 2019, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/09/bolsonaro-diz-que-parte-da-….
 “Bolsonaro Cancela Assinaturas Da Folha No Governo Federal e Ameaça Anunciantes Do Jornal,” Folha de S.Paulo, November 1, 2019, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/10/bolsonaro-determina-cancela…; Paul Farhi, “Trump Instructs Federal Agencies to End Washington Post and New York Times Subscriptions,” Washington Post, October 25, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/trump-instructs-federal-….
 Gustavo Uribe, “Bolsonaro Recua e Revoga Licitação Da Presidência Que Excluiu a Folha,” Folha de S.Paulo, December 6, 2019, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/12/bolsonaro-recua-e-revoga-licitacao-da-presidencia-que-excluiu-a-folha.shtml; Fernanda Valente, “MP pede que TCU apure perseguição de Bolsonaro ao excluir Folha de licitação,” Consultor Jurídico, November 29, 2019, https://www.conjur.com.br/2019-nov-29/mp-tcu-apure-perseguicao-bolsonaro-folha-spaulo.
 “Bolsonaro Critica Imprensa e Ataca Repórter,” Poder360, May 16, 2019, https://www.poder360.com.br/midia/bolsonaro-critica-imprensa-e-ataca-reporter/; Larissa Calixto, “Bolsonaro Ataca Jornalista Da Folha Com Comentários Sexuais,” Congresso em Foco, February 18, 2020, https://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/governo/bolsonaro-ataca-jornalista-da-folha-com-comentarios-sexuais/; “Planalto Exclui ‘Folha’ Da Cobertura De Jantar De Bolsonaro Com Trump Nos EUA,” G1, March 7, 2020, https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/03/07/planalto-exclui-folha-….
 Lais Lis, “Imprensa Sofreu 11 Mil Ataques Diários Nas Redes Sociais Em 2019, Diz Associação De Rádio e TV,” March 11, 2020, https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/03/11/casos-de-violencia-con….
 Hannah Ellis-Petersen, “Philippines libel trial of journalist critical of Rodrigo Duterte begins,” July 23, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/23/philippines-libel-trial-of-maria-ressa-journalist-critical-of-president-duterte-begins.
 “Philippines’ Duterte Tells Media Conglomerate Owners to Sell Out,” Aljazeera, December 30, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/philippines-duterte-tells-media-cong….
 Alexandra Stevenson, “Maria Ressa, Journalist Critical of Duterte, Is Arrested Again in Philippines,” March 28, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/business/media/maria-ressa-arrested-philippines-rappler.html; Lian Buan, “LIST: Cases vs Maria Ressa, Rappler directors, staff since 2018,” February 25, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/nation/223968-list-cases-filed-against-maria-ressa-rappler-reporters.
 “154 Attacks, Threats vs Journalists since Duterte Took Office – Media Groups,” Rappler, December 11, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/nation/246992-recorded-attacks-threats-vs-journ….
 Daniel Avelar, “WhatsApp Fake News during Brazil Election ‘Favoured Bolsonaro,’” The Guardian, October 30, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/30/whatsapp-fake-news-brazil-election-favoured-jair-bolsonaro-analysis-suggests; Tom Philips, “Bolsonaro Business Backers Accused of Illegal Whatsapp Fake News Campaign,” The Guardian, October 18, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/18/brazil-jair-bolsonaro-whatsapp-fake-news-campaign; Matheus Magenta, Juliana Gragnani, and Felipe Souza, “How WhatsApp Is Being Abused in Brazil’s Elections,” October 24, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-45956557.
 Artur Rodrigues and Patricia Campos Mello, “Fraude Com CPF Viabilizou Disparo De Mensagens De WhatsApp Na Eleição,” Folha de S.Paulo, December 2, 2018, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/12/fraude-com-cpf-viabilizou-disparo-de-mensagens-de-whatsapp-na-eleicao.shtml; “Países Precisam Se Preparar Para Abrigar Venezuelanos Por Muito Tempo, Diz Representante Da ONU,” Folha de S.Paulo, March 25, 2019, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2019/03/paises-precisam-se-preparar-para-abrigar-venezuelanos-por-muito-tempo-diz-representante-da-onu.shtml; Patricia Campos Mello, “Empresários Bancam Campanha Contra o PT Pelo WhatsApp,” Folha de S.Paulo, October 18, 2018, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/empresarios-bancam-campanha….
 Chay F. Hofileña, “Fake Accounts, Manufactured Reality on Social Media,” Rappler, October 9, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/investigative/148347-fake-accounts-ma….
 Paige Occeñola, “Exclusive: PH Was Cambridge Analytica’s ‘Petri Dish’ – Whistle-Blower Christopher Wylie,” Rappler, September 10, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/technology/social-media/239606-cambridge-analyt….
 João Filho, “‘Na Ditadura Tudo Era Melhor.’” The Intercept Brasil, September 23, 2018, https://theintercept.com/2018/09/22/na-ditadura-tudo-era-melhor-entenda…; Ana Beatriz Rosa, “9 Pontos Para Entender Por Que a Ditadura Não Foi ‘Gloriosa’ Como Bolsonaro Defende,” HuffPost Brasil, March 31, 2020, https://www.huffpostbrasil.com/entry/ditadura-militar-bolsonaro_br_5c9b…; Jean-Philip Struck, “O Brasil Do Regime Militar Idealizado Por Bolsonaro,” Deutsche Welle, March 27, 2019, https://www.dw.com/pt-br/o-brasil-do-regime-militar-idealizado-por-bols….
 Oswaldo E. do Amaral, “A Base De Apoio a Jair Bolsonaro,” El País, October 4, 2018, https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2018/10/04/opinion/1538678574_649992.html; “Eleições 2022: Os Diferentes Mundos Que Apoiam Bolsonaro Ou Lula,” Veja, October 18, 2019, https://veja.abril.com.br/politica/eleicoes-2022-os-diferentes-mundos-q…; “Jair Bolsonaro Diz Que a Minoria Tem Que Se Adequar a Maioria 10/02/17,” February 15, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BCkEwP8TeZY. (In this video from the 2017 campaign he says, “We are a Christian country. We will govern for the majorities. The minorities [aka minority groups] will have to bend to the majorities.” Translation by Mario Braga.)
 Fabiano Maisonnave for Climate Home, part of the Guardian Environment Network, “Amazon at Risk from Bolsonaro’s Grim Attack on the Environment,” The Guardian, October 9, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/09/brazils-bolsonaro-w….
 Bruna Soares de Aguiar and Matheus Ribeiro Pereira, “O antifeminismo como backlash nos discursos do governo Bolsonaro,” Agenda Política 7, no. 3 (2019): 8-35.
 “Bolsonaro ‘Ataca Frontalmente’ Os Direitos Humanos, Alerta HRW,” Uol, October 17, 2019, https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/afp/2019/10/16/bolsonaro-a….
 Ingrid Soares, “Bolsonaro critica ambientalistas: ‘Fumam cigarrinho ‘legal’ a noite toda,’” Correio Braziliense, February, 6, 2020, https://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/app/noticia/politica/2020/02/06/i….
 See for example, Jean-Philip Struck, “Acabar Com o Crime No Rio, Uma Velha Promessa,” Deutsche Welle, March 14, 2018, https://www.dw.com/pt-br/acabar-com-o-crime-no-rio-uma-velha-promessa/a-42964088; Thaiza Pauluze, “Doria Deixa No Papel Maioria De Suas Promessas Para Segurança Pública,” Folha de S.Paulo, August 17, 2019, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2019/08/doria-deixa-no-papel-ma…; Eduardo Rodrigues, “Dilma Promete Integrar Polícias Para Aumentar Segurança Pública,” Estadão, October 19, 2014, https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/eleicoes,dilma-promete-integrar-policias-para-aumentar-seguranca-publica,1579295; “Governo Lula Promete Aumentar Verba Da Segurança Após Críticas,” Folha de S.Paulo, January 11, 2007, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/cotidian/ff1101200710.htm.
 See for example, “Philippines: Two Years Under Aquino, Abuses Go Unpunished,” Human Rights Watch, June 27, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/27/philippines-two-years-under-aquino-abuses-go-unpunished; Mark R. Thompson, “Bloodied Democracy: Duterte and the Death of Liberal Reformism in the Philippines,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no. 3 (2016): 39–68. https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341603500303.
 Shasta Darlington, “A Year of Violence Sees Brazil’s Murder Rate Hit Record High,” New York Times, August 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/world/americas/brazil-murder-rate-re….
 Sheila Royo Maxwell, “Perceived Threat of Crime, Authoritarianism, and the Rise of a Populist President in the Philippines,” International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 43, no. 3 (December 17, 2018): 207–18, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01924036.2018.1558084 .
 Pia Ranada, “Is Duterte’s ‘4 Million Drug Addicts’ a ‘Real Number’?” Rappler, May 6, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/rappler-blogs/169009-duterte-drug-addicts-real-….
 Pia Ranada, “A Look at the State of Crime, Drugs in the Philippines,” Rappler January 5, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/nation/118004-crime-drugs-philippines.
 “Duterte, Alan Cayetano Appear on Video: ‘Change Is Coming,’” Inquirer News, December 8, 2015, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/745675/duterte-alan-cayetano-appear-on-vi….
 Richard Heydarian interviewed by Ramon H. Royandoyan on March 03, 2020.
 Arjan Aguirre, interviewed by Ramon H. Royandoyan on November 19, 2019.
 Arjan Aguirre, interviewed by Ramon H. Royandoyan on November 19, 2019.
 Mario Braga and Ramon H. Royandoyan. “What Can Brazil Learn from the Philippines?,” November 18, 2018, https://brazilian.report/power/2018/11/18/brazil-philippines-bolsonaro-….
 Richard Javad Heydarian, The Rise of Duterte: A Populist Revolt Against Elite Democracy (Palgrave Pivot, 2018) 4-6, 97-98, 110-111.
 See for example, OECD, Under Pressure: The Squeezed Middle Class (ParisL OECD Publishing, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1787/689afed1-en; Tamar Manuelyan Atinc and Carol Graham, “Can Education Reform Address Inequality and Middle Class Frustration? An Experiment in Chile,” Brookings, July 29, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/education-plus-development/2014/05/09/can-education-reform-address-inequality-and-middle-class-frustration-an-experiment-in-chile/; Adele Webb, “Why Are the Middle Class Misbehaving?: Exploring Democratic Ambivalence and Authoritarian Nostalgia,” Philippine Sociological Review 65 (2017): 77-102, www.jstor.org/stable/45014310; Paulo Prada, “Special Report: Why Brazil’s New Middle Class Is Seething,” Reuters, July 3, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-middle-specialreport/special-….
 Gustavo Patu, “Novos Dados Indicam Que Recente Recessão Não Foi a Pior Da História,” Folha de S.Paulo, February 12, 2017, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2017/12/1940049-novos-dados-indic….
 Daniel Silveira, “Crise Levou 4,5 Milhões a Mais à Extrema Pobreza e Fez Desigualdade Atingir Nível Recorde No Brasil, Diz IBGE,” G1, November 5, 2019, https://g1.globo.com/economia/noticia/2019/11/06/crise-levou-45-milhoes….
 Felipe Matoso, “Governo Dilma Tem Aprovação De 9% e Reprovação De 70%, Diz Ibope,” G1, December 15, 2015, http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2015/12/governo-dilma-tem-aprovaca…; Pedro Venceslau, “Após Protestos, Aprovação a Governadores Cai Junto Com Popularidade De Dilma - Política,” Estadão, July 26, 2013, https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,apos-protestos-aprovacao….
 Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, (Penguin UK, 2018), 179-222.
 Francisco Porfírio, “Cotas Raciais: Criação, Leis, Argumentos Pró e Contra,” Brasil Escola, accessed May 16, 2020, https://brasilescola.uol.com.br/educacao/sistema-cotas-racial.htm.
 Deborah Wetzel, “Bolsa Família: Brazil’s Quiet Revolution,” World Bank, November 4, 2013, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2013/11/04/bolsa-familia-Braz….
 “Pobreza Extrema Cresce No Brasil e Afeta 13,5 Milhões De Pessoas,” Deutsche Welle, November 7, 2019, https://www.dw.com/pt-br/pobreza-extrema-cresce-no-brasil-e-afeta-135-m…ões-de-pessoas/a-51147425.
 “Pobreza Extrema Cresce No Brasil e Afeta 13,5 Milhões De Pessoas,” Deutsche Welle, November 7, 2019, https://www.dw.com/pt-br/pobreza-extrema-cresce-no-brasil-e-afeta-135-m…ões-de-pessoas/a-51147425; Carmen Nery, “Extrema Pobreza Atinge 13,5 Milhões De Pessoas e Chega Ao Maior Nível Em 7 Anos,” Agência IBGE, November 6, 2019, https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/agencia-noticias/2012-agencia-de-….
 Ben O. de Vera, “EIU: PH to Be among Fastest-Growing Economies in 2020s,” Inquirer, December 21, 2019, https://business.inquirer.net/285870/eiu-ph-to-be-among-fastest-growing….
 “Ease of Doing Business rankings,” The World Bank, accessed May 20, 2020, https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings#.
 Richard Heydarian, interviewed by Mario Braga on October 30, 2018.
 “Brasil Tem 77 Partidos Em Processo De Formação,” Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, December 23, 2019, http://www.tse.jus.br/imprensa/noticias-tse/2019/Dezembro/brasil-tem-77….
 “Brazil’s President Bolsonaro launches new political party,” BBC, November 21, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50507996.
 Felipe B. Miranda, “Leadership and Political Stabilization in a Post-Aquino Philippines,” Philippine Political Science Journal 17, no. 33-36 (April 18, 2012): 142–222, https://doi.org/10.1080/01154451.1992.9754180.
 Edwin Espejo, “Could Duterte be the Liberal Party’s wild card bet?” Rappler, March 18, 2015, https://www.rappler.com/nation/87197-duterte-lp-wild-card-candidate-2016.
 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “The Philippines: Political Parties and Corruption,” Southeast Asian Affairs 2007 (2007): 277–94.
 Carl H. Lande, “Parties and Politics in the Philippines,” Asian Survey 8, no. 9 (1968): 725-47, doi:10.2307/2642641.
 Pauline Macaraeg, “Who to Vote For? Get To Know the Political Parties in the Philippines,” Esquire, January 27, 2020, https://www.esquiremag.ph/politics/news/political-parties-in-the-philippines-a00287-20190127-lfrm; Jorge Villamor Tigno, “The party-list system in the Philippines: Is it better or worse for democracy?” Asia Research Institute, July 4, 2019, https://theasiadialogue.com/2019/07/04/the-party-list-system-in-the-philippines-is-it-better-or-worse-for-democracy/.
 Richard Javad Heydarian, “Penal Populism in Emerging Markets,” in Human Rights in a Time of Populism: Challenges and Responses ed Gerald L. Neuman (Cambrdige, MA: Cambrdige University Press, 2020): 130.
 Mark R. Thompson, “Why Duterte Remains So Popular.” Foreign Affairs, October 11, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/philippines/2018-10-09/why-dute….
 Randy David, “‘Dutertismo,’” Inquirer Opinion, May 1, 2016, https://opinion.inquirer.net/94530/dutertismo.
 Mark R. Thompson, “Why Duterte Remains So Popular.” Foreign Affairs, October 11, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/philippines/2018-10-09/why-dute….
 Lian Buan, “TokHang Documents Prove Drug War Caused Cops to Kill Suspects,” Rappler, October 23, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/nation/243230-flag-says-tokhang-documents-prove….
 Peter Bouckaert, “‘License to Kill’ Philippine Police Killings in Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs,’” Human Rights Watch, March 2, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/03/02/license-kill/philippine-police-killings-dutertes-war-drugs; Manuel Mogato and Clare Baldwin, “Special Report: Police describe kill rewards, staged crime scenes in Duterte’s drug war,” Reuters, April 18, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-duterte-police-specialrep/special-report-police-describe-kill-rewards-staged-crime-scenes-in-dutertes-drug-war-idUSKBN17K1F4; Mikas Matsuzawa and Patricia Viray, “Casualties of Rody’s war,” PhilStar Global, September 19, 2016, https://newslab.philstar.com/war-on-drugs/poverty.
 Peter Bouckaert, “‘License to Kill’ Philippine Police Killings in Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs,’” Human Rights Watch, March 2, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/03/02/license-kill/philippine-police-killings-dutertes-war-drugs.
 “IN NUMBERS: The Philippines’ ‘war on drugs,’” Rappler, September 13, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/145814-numbers-statistics-philippines-war-drugs.
 Felipe Villamor and Richard C. Paddock, “Nearly 1,800 Killed in Duterte’s Drug War, Philippine Police Official Tells Senators,” New York Times, August 22, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/world/asia/philippines-rodrigo-duter….
 Matthew Tostevin, “War on Numbers: Philippines Targets Drug Killing Data,” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, July 18, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-drugs/war-on-numbers-philippines-targets-drug-killing-data-idUSKCN1UD1CJ; Emmanuel Tupas, “29,000 Deaths Probed since Drug War Launched,” PhilStar Global, March 5, 2019, https://www.philstar.com/nation/2019/03/06/1898959/29000-deaths-probed-drug-war-launched; Davinci Maru, “CHR chief: Drug war deaths could be as high as 27,000,” ABS CBN News, December 5, 2018, https://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/12/05/18/chr-chief-drug-war-deaths-could-be-as-high-as-27000; Lian Buan, Rambo Talabong, and Jodesz Gavilan, “Duterte Gov’t Allows ‘Drug War’ Deaths to Go Unsolved,” Rappler, January 14, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/220595-duterte-government-drug-war-deaths-unsolved; “Everything You Need to Know about Human Rights in the Philippines,” Amnesty International, accessed May 20, 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/philippines/r….
 Kenneth Roth, “World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Philippines” Human Rights Watch, January 22, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/philippines.
 Richard C. Paddock, “Becoming Duterte: The Making of a Philippine Strongman,” New York Times, March 21, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-philippin….
 Pia Ranada, “Duterte: I Take Marijuana to Stay Awake,” Rappler, December 3, 2018, https://www.rappler.com/nation/218111-duterte-says-he-takes-marijuana-s….
 Adriana Aguiar, “Resultado Do Referendo Mudará Pouca Coisa Sobre Uso De Armas,” Consultor Jurídico, October 9, 2005, https://www.conjur.com.br/2005-out-09/resultado_mudara_coisa_uso_armas_fogo; Antonio Carlos Moriel Sanchez, “Pessoa Física (Cidadão),” Portal da Polícia Federal do Brasil, March 4, 2020, http://www.pf.gov.br/servicos-pf/armas/aquisicao/pessoa-fisica-cidadao.
 Tom Phillips, “‘Firearms Safeguard Freedom’: Brazil’s New President Vows to Relax Gun Laws,” The Guardian, October 30, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/30/firearms-safeguard-freedo….
 Tom Phillips, “Jair Bolsonaro Says Criminals Will ‘Die like Cockroaches’ under Proposed New Laws.” The Guardian, August 5, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/06/jair-bolosonaro-says-crim….
 Andre Peixoto,“Bolsonaro: ‘O Cidadão Armado é a Primeira Linha De Defesa De Um País,’” O Tempo, June 30, 2015, https://www.otempo.com.br/politica/bolsonaro-o-cidadao-armado-e-a-primeira-linha-de-defesa-de-um-pais-1.1060490. Translation by the author.
 “Decreto De Bolsonaro Facilita Porte De Armas Para 20 Categorias,” Deutsche Welle, May 8, 2019, https://www.dw.com/pt-br/decreto-de-bolsonaro-facilita-porte-de-armas-p….
 Pedro Rafael Vilela, “Bolsonaro Revoga Decreto De Armas e Publica Novas Regras,” Agência Brasil, June 25, 2019, http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2019-06/bolsonaro-revo….
 “Congresso Aponta Excessos Em Novo Decreto De Armas,” Deutsche Welle, May 10, 2019, https://www.dw.com/pt-br/congresso-aponta-excessos-em-novo-decreto-de-a….
 Delis Ortiz and Fernanda Vivas, “Bolsonaro Decide Revogar Decreto Que Facilita Porte De Arma De Fogo e Edita Outros Três,” G1, June 25, 2019, https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2019/06/25/bolsonaro-decide-revog….
 “Bolsonaro: ‘Dependo Do Parlamento Para Ampliar Posse e Porte De Armas.,’” O Antagonista, December 29, 2019, https://www.oantagonista.com/brasil/bolsonaro-dependo-do-parlamento-par….
 Jair M. Bolsonaro, Twitter, December 29, 2019, https://twitter.com/jairbolsonaro/status/1211268726043140096
 “Monitor Da Violência: Assassinatos Caem Em 2019, Mas Letalidade Policial Aumenta; Nº De Presos Provisórios Volta a Crescer,” G1, December 9, 2019, https://g1.globo.com/retrospectiva/2019/noticia/2019/12/16/monitor-da-v….
 Clara Velasco Thiago Reis, and Felipe Grandin, “Número De Pessoas Mortas Pela Polícia Cresce No Brasil Em 2019; Assassinatos De Policiais Caem Pela Metade,” G1, April 13, 2020, https://g1.globo.com/monitor-da-violencia/noticia/2020/04/16/numero-de-….
 Bruno Paes Manso, “Novo Recorde De Letalidade Mostra Dificuldade Dos Estados Em Controlar Suas Polícias,” G1, April 16, 2020, https://g1.globo.com/monitor-da-violencia/noticia/2020/04/16/novo-recor….
 “Anuário Brasileiro De Segurança Pública,” Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, June 26, 2019, http://forumseguranca.org.br/anuario-brasileiro-seguranca-publica/.
 Cláudia Trevisan, “Bancada evangélica cresce 63% na Câmara,” Folha de S.Paulo, February 1, 1999, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc01029907.htm; Edgar Lisboa, “Bancada Evangélica Triplicou,” Jornal do Commercio, September 17, 2019, https://www.jornaldocomercio.com/_conteudo/colunas/reporter_brasilia/20….
 Andrew Fishman, “Jair Bolsonaro Is Elected President of Brazil. Read His Extremist, Far-Right Positions in His Own Words,” The Intercept, October 28, 2018, https://theintercept.com/2018/10/28/jair-bolsonaro-elected-president-brazil/
 Jen Kirby, “Jair Bolsonaro Says Brazil and the US Stand Side by Side ‘against Fake News,’” Vox, March 19, 2019, https://www.vox.com/2019/3/19/18272995/jair-bolsonaro-trump-white-house-brazil-fake-news.
 Michael Fox, “Education Is in the Crosshairs in Bolsonaro’s Brazil,” The Nation, January 15, 2019, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/brazil-bolsonaro-education-repression/.
 “Bolsonaro To Erase Paulo Freire And Feminism From Textbooks,” teleSUR English, February 12, 2019, https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Bolsonaro-To-Erase-Paulo-Freire-and-Feminism-From-Textbooks-20190212-0018.html.
 Jonathan Watts, “Brazil’s New Foreign Minister Believes Climate Change Is a Marxist Plot,” The Guardian, November 15, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/15/brazil-foreign-minister-ernesto-araujo-climate-change-marxist-plot.
 Elyse Samuels, “Brazil’s President Resurrects the Zombie Claim That Nazism Was a Leftist Movement,” The Washington Post, May 7, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/07/brazils-president-resurrects-zombie-claim-that-nazism-was-leftist-movement/.
 Nick Burns, “Brazil’s Foreign Minister Wants to Save the West From Postmodernism,” Foreign Affairs, January 24, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/brazil/2019-01-24/brazils-forei….
 “Bolsonaro Contraria Dados Do Governo e Diz Que Fogo Na Amazônia é Restrito a Regiões Desmatadas,” GaúchaZH, August 24, 2019, https://gauchazh.clicrbs.com.br/ambiente/noticia/2019/08/bolsonaro-contraria-dados-do-governo-e-diz-que-fogo-na-amazonia-e-restrito-a-regioes-desmatadas-cjzpt19ob004001n79xxxllhf.html; “Demitido Por Bolsonaro, Ricardo Galvão é Eleito ‘Cientista Do Ano,’” Veja, December 13, 2019, https://veja.abril.com.br/ciencia/demitido-por-bolsonaro-ricardo-galvao….
 Jonathan Watts, “Jair Bolsonaro Claims NGOs behind Amazon Forest Fire Surge – but Provides No Evidence,” The Guardian, August 21, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/21/jair-bolsonaro-accuses-ngos-setting-fire-amazon-rainforest.
 Jonathan Watts, “Brazil’s President Claims DiCaprio Paid for Amazon Fires,” The Guardian, November 29, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/29/brazils-president-claims-dicaprio-paid-for-amazon-fires.
 Rebecca Tan, “In the Fight for Gay Marriage in the Philippines, Duterte Could Be an Unlikely Ally,” The Washington Post, June 19, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/06/19/in-the-fig….
 Darryl John Esguerra, “Duterte Fires Last Leftist in Government,” Inquirer News, October 3, 2018, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1038554/duterte-fires-last-leftist-in-gov….
 Pia Gutierrez, “Duterte says relieved Congress rejected leftist leaders’ Cabinet appointments,” ABS CBN News, September 26, 2018, https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/09/26/18/duterte-says-relieved-congress-r….
 “How Duterte Spent His President’s Social Fund In 2017,” Rappler, https://www.rappler.com/nation/206638-how-duterte-spent-presidential-so….
 Pia Ranada, “Duterte Slams Climate Change Conferences for Accomplishing ‘Nothing,’” Rappler, May 31, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/nation/231941-duterte-slams-climate-change-conf….
 “Third Quarter 2018 Social Weather Survey: Net Trust in Rody Duterte rises to “Very Good” +62,” Social Weather Stations, October 27, 2018, https://www.sws.org.ph/swsmain/artcldisppage/?artcsyscode=ART-20181027115939.
 “Duterte Reiterates Support for Family Planning but Not Abortion,” ABS-CBN News, March 11, 2017, https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/03/11/17/duterte-reiterates-support-for-f….
 Pia Ranada, “Duterte Pushes for Return of Death Penalty for Drug Crimes, Plunder,” Rappler, July 22, 2019, https://www.rappler.com/nation/236024-duterte-pushes-return-death-penal….
 Aurora Almendral, “Crony Capital: How Duterte Embraced the Oligarchs,” Nikkei Asian Review, December 4, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cover-Story/Crony-capital-How-Duterte….
 Alexis Romero, “Misogynist? Duterte Invokes Freedom of Expression” PhilStar Global, March 12, 2019, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2019/03/13/1901004/misogynist-dutert….
 Arjan Aguirre interviewed by Ramon H. Royandoyan on November 19, 2019.
 Luiz Felipe Barbieri, “Governo Bolsonaro Tem Aprovação De 29% e Reprovação De 38%, Diz Pesquisa Ibope,” G1, December 20, 2019, https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2019/12/20/governo-bolsonaro-tem-….
 Joao Pedro Caleiro, “Governo Bolsonaro é Aprovado Por 35% e Reprovado Por 27%, Diz Pesquisa,” Exame, April 24, 2019, https://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/governo-bolsonaro-e-aprovado-por-35-d….
 Alessi, Gil. “Bolsonaro é Alvo De Panelaço e De Novo Pedido De Impeachment,” EL PAÍS, March 18, 2020, https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2020-03-18/bolsonaro-e-alvo-de-panelac….
 “#MassTestingNow: Online Petition Calls for Urgent Action on PH Coronavirus Outbreak,” Rappler, March 22, 2020, https://www.rappler.com/move-ph/255466-online-petition-calls-urgent-action-coronavirus-outbreak-ph; “Social (Status) Distancing? Filipinos Seek Comic Relief through Memes during Lockdown,” Rappler, March 22, 2020, https://www.rappler.com/nation/255491-social-status-distancing-filpinos-comic-relief-memes-coronavirus-lockdown; “DOH Justifies COVID-19 Testing of Asymptomatic Gov’t Officials,” Inquirer, March 23, 2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1246874/covid-19-testing-of-asymptomatic-….
 Lucas Borges Teixeira, “Juristas: Instituições Têm De Cobrar De Bolsonaro Prova De Fraude Eleitoral,” UOL, March 10, 2020, https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2020/03/10/juristas-instituicoes-tem-de-cobrar-de-bolsonaro-prova-de-fraude-eleitoral.htm.
 Marina Dias, “‘Quero Que Você Me Ache Um Brasileiro Que Confie No Sistema Eleitoral’, Diz Bolsonaro,” Folha de S.Paulo, March 10, 2020, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/03/quero-que-voce-me-ache-um-b…. Translated by Mario Braga.
 Claudio Ferraz, Filipe Campante, and Rodrigo R. Soares, “Artigo: A Democracia Em Tempos De Crise,” Época, March 20, 2020, https://epoca.globo.com/brasil/artigo-a-democracia-em-tempos-de-crise-2….
 Richard Heydarian interviewed by Ramon H. Royandoyan on March 3, 2020
 Fabiano Santos and José Szwako, “Da ruptura à reconstrução democrática no Brasil,” Saúde em Debate 40 (2016): 114-121. Translated by Mario Braga.
 Regine Cabato, “Philippine Midterm Elections Deliver a Resounding Vote of Confidence for Duterte,” The Washington Post, May 14, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/philippine-midterm-elections-deliv…; Vergel O Santos, “The Philippines Just Became More Authoritarian, Thanks to the People,” New York Times, May 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/24/opinion/philippines-duterte-election….
 Jason Gutierrez, “Philippines Election: Duterte Allies Sweep Senate, Unofficial Results Indicate,” New York Times, May 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/world/asia/philippines-election-resu….
 Adriana Ferraz, Caio Sartori, and Alessandra Monnerat, “Ex-Aliados De Bolsonaro, Doria e Witzel Miram 2022 – Política,” Estadão, January 5, 2020, https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,descolados-de-bolsonaro-….
 Breiller Pires, “‘A Radicalização Sustenta o Protagonismo De Bolsonaro Na Direita,’” EL PAÍS, September 26, 2019, https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2019/09/25/politica/1569363708_151865….
 Ronaldo de Almeida, “Bolsonaro presidente: conservadorismo, evangelismo e a crise brasileira,” Novos estud. CEBRAP, vol.38, n.1 (2019), 185-213, https://doi.org/10.25091/s01013300201900010010.
 Clara Cerioni, “Um Raio-x De Como Ficam as Assembleias Legislativas Do País,” Exame, October 10, 2018, https://exame.abril.com.br/brasil/um-raio-x-de-como-ficam-as-assembleia….
 Ranier Bragon and Bernardo Caram, “Número De Médicos e Professores Cai Na Câmara; Militares e Religiosos Sobem,” Folha de S.Paulo, November 5, 2018, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/11/numero-de-medicos-e-professores-cai-na-camara-militares-e-religiosos-sobem.shtml .
 “Cai Apoio à Democracia No Brasil Durante Governo Bolsonaro; Apoio à Ditadura Militar Permanece Estável,” G1, January 1, 2020, https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/01/01/cai-apoio-a-democracia….
 Jamil Chade, “Brasil Veta Termo ‘Gênero’ Em Resoluções Da ONU e Cria Mal-Estar,” UOL, June 27, 2019, https://jamilchade.blogosfera.uol.com.br/2019/06/27/brasil-veta-termo-g….
 “2nd International Conference on Christian Persecution,” 2nd International Conference on Christian Persecution, November 26, 2019, https://www.iccphungary.com/.
 Guilherme Evelin, “Análise: Os Perigos Da Guinada Radical No Itamaraty,” Época, November 14, 2018, https://epoca.globo.com/analise-os-perigos-da-guinada-radical-no-itamar….
 Jamil Chade, “Itamaraty Contraria Constituição e Prega Religião Como Política De Estado,” UOL, November 28, 2019, https://noticias.uol.com.br/colunas/jamil-chade/2019/11/28/governo-bols….
 Fernando Caulyt, “‘Com Bolsonaro, Política Externa Se Tornou Uma Caixa De Surpresas,’” Deutsche Welle, July 1, 2019, https://www.dw.com/pt-br/com-bolsonaro-política-externa-se-tornou-uma-caixa-de-surpresas/a-49407488.
 “Steve Bannon Welcomes Eduardo Bolsonaro as Head of The Movement in South America,” The Movement, February 2, 2019, https://donotlink.it/bRjAQ.