The sun was high and the air thick with a weighted August heat as we sat down for lunch at Schmetterling, a Persian restaurant in the heart of Chemnitz, Germany. Anne Gersch, a staff member of Courage, a project that facilitates anti-discrimination trainings in schools throughout the state of Saxony, recommended we meet there. She pointed to an adjacent street that a far-right anti-immigration group, PRO Chemnitz, had marched along during the regular demonstrations they held throughout the previous fall. During one demonstration last September, Schmetterling’s windows were smashed in—minor damage compared to the three other immigrant-owned restaurants attacked in the last year, but all echoes of the violent riots that had made Chemnitz an international headline in the summer of 2018.[1]
When a mob of 800 protestors took to the streets on August 26, 2018, with the declared mission to show “who has the say in the city,” it made the news in Germany.[2] Videos showed hordes of protestors chasing down and attacking people they perceived to be refugees or immigrants.[3] When 6,000 protestors turned out the following day, including members of far-right parties and groups, it made news around the world, and many international media accounts falsely portrayed Chemnitz as a city full of Nazis.[4] A year later, people are watching Chemnitz and asking how the city became a hotbed of far-right organizing; what happened in the riots’ aftermath; and how anti-racist organizing there is possible, amid local and state governments that are shifting ever rightward.
Over lunch, Gersch and I talked about the likelihood that Germany’s far-right party, Alternative for Deutschland (AfD), would gain power in the upcoming September elections. The AfD became the strongest party in Saxony in 2017.[5] Notably, support for the AfD rose by two points after the racist riots in Chemnitz.[6] She was concerned, but determined to stay. “It will be a really difficult five years, but I have no plans to leave,” she said. “There are many of us who are staying and [who will] keep on working to discuss discrimination in our society.”[7]
The Spark
Early in the morning hours of Sunday, August 26, 2018, a fight broke out between men from a city festival near a popular kebab restaurant. Several were injured and one man, who would be identified as Daniel Hillig, died from stab wounds later that day. Two men were also taken into police custody as suspects: Yousif A., who had come to Germany from Iraq, and Alaa S., who had come from Syria. (Yousif A. would ultimately be released due to a lack of evidence, while Alaa S. was convicted in August 2019.)[8]
Later that morning, false rumors began to circulate that the victim, of Cuban-German descent, had died while protecting a woman the killer had molested and that a second victim had been killed.[9] A far-right hooligan soccer fan club called Kaotic Chemnitz called for a demonstration that afternoon at the Karl Marx Monument in the city center. They wanted to show, as their social media accounts noted, “who is in the driver’s seat in the city.”[10]
The message spread quickly online, with the slogans “Our city, our rules!” and “Let’s show who has the last word in this city.”[11] Anti-refugee protestors began to convene. The 800 protestors vastly outnumbered the police presence at the scene (estimated variously as just 50 or 80 officers), and soon they moved from the city center into surrounding streets.[12] Small groups broke off and began chasing people they assumed were refugees or immigrants,[13] continuing for an hour before dispersing.
PRO Chemnitz called for a demonstration the following day, posting an invitation on Facebook to anyone discontent with the impacts of immigration to German society.[14] By Monday morning, the response to the post made it clear that this demonstration would be larger than Sunday’s. When it began that afternoon, Martin Kohlmann, the founder of PRO Chemnitz, spoke about the degradation of Germany society from the influx of refugees. He blamed the current government, alluding to its demise, and the change that an anti-refugee movement could bring. Soon, around 6,000 people took to the streets, far outnumbering the 591 deployed police officers and a smaller band of 1,500 counter-protestors, organized by the group “Chemnitz Nazifrei” (Keep Chemnitz Free of Nazis).[15] As on Sunday, small groups broke out into the cityscape, “with many masked men hunting down foreigners,” as the UK think tank Institute of Race Relations reported.[16]
Far-right protesters from all over Germany, and neighboring countries, had traveled to Chemnitz to participate, according to local reporters. Among those present were local and regional far-right hooligan soccer fan groups such as Kaotic; representatives from the city’s far-right political parties, such as PRO Chemnitz and AfD (according to a local reporter); and nationalist parties from across Germany, such as The Third Way and the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD).[17] State representatives from AfD traveled to Chemnitz, including AfD’s women’s organization, FridA (Frauen in der AfD), although they refrained from wearing party logos or symbols, according to an advisor with Kulturbüro Sachsen (Saxony), a Dresden-based organization that supports democratic education. Leaders within the far-right, anti-Islam PEGIDA movement, some of whom hold city council offices, were also in attendance. These formal brigades were also joined by everyday “angry citizens” or Wutbürger—a term now common in Germany to describe a particular kind of racism, where German citizens become outraged, and at times violent, in response to immigration issues.[18]
The Gas Before the Spark
The riots in Chemnitz were neither typical nor inevitable. Rather, argued Liz Fekete, director of the Institute of Race Relations, they reflected a continuation of fascist mobilizations with a deep history in Germany.[19] “Chemnitz felt almost like a pre-pogrom, that if something didn’t happen very quickly [to stop it], it could have turned into another Rostock,” she said, referring to the 1992 incident where petrol bombs burned an asylum house for refugees while several thousand bystanders looked on, or even applauded.[20] Similar incidents took place in the German cities of Hoyerswerda in 1991 and Mannheim-Schönau in 1992, as neonazis from around the country joined local residents in attacking the homes of refugees.[21]
In August 2015, this theme picked up again in Heidenau, where sieges against immigrant communities continued over several days with minimal response from the police.[22] Fekete believes the revival of these kinds of attacks are, in part, a consequence of U.S. war policies and militarism. She argued, “In Europe, the main breeding ground for this [far-right violence]—is the Islamophobia that came out of the War on Terror and the [resulting] ‘refugee crisis.’ It fed the Far Right.” Increased migration from the Middle East and Africa to Europe in 2015 only exacerbated tensions, and the riots in Chemnitz became just one feature of rising far-right mobilization in eastern Germany, enabled by growing anti-refugee sentiment nationwide.
While the August 2018 riots were marked by the speed with which they came together and spread—in part due to social media—other, longer-standing far-right structures had already laid the groundwork in Chemnitz.[23]
Danilo Starosta, an advisor with Kulturbüro Sachsen, traced the foundation of these structures to the traumas of national reunification after the fall of Communism. He described how little attention was given to transitioning a whole society from socialism to capitalism. This transition process did not account for the tensions and conflicts present in the German Democratic Republic that might then be leveraged. And that, he said, “enabled Nazi movements to grow and become strong.”[24] German reunification was also conducted on very nationalistic terms and at times privileged citizenship status to mostly Germans.[25] This seemed to affirm right-wing claims that nationalism is worthy of investment, Starosta explained.
On a very concrete level, as the capitalist society of West Germany began restructuring the East, the demolition industry boomed with new work in tearing down East German buildings and infrastructure.[26] Through this, large numbers of German men were ushered into Chemnitz as workers in the demolition industry. They worked together during the day and lived together in shared houses at night. This set-up, Starosta argues, was an important part of developing neonazi structures in Chemnitz—self-organized neonazi houses that could spread ideology through work and home life.
These early associations later gave rise to more formal neonazi organizatons, such as Blood and Honour, which expanded into individuals’ social lives. For instance, since the 1990s, a new generation of völkisch settlers have moved to eastern states like Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, drawn by comparatively cheap land and the opportunity to set up nationalistic communities.[27] This, coupled with ongoing demographic collapse in rural regions of eastern Germany, correlated with neonazi activity in Germany’s environmental movement. And the rustic image of rural living evokes the kind of lifestyle venerated by large strands of the Far Right today. But the neonazi lifestyle is not limited to the countryside. As Gersch explained, “As a Nazi, you have always had a good life in Chemnitz. You can go to concerts, have [public] discussions, work in Nazi-owned shops. There are economies for them.” Within this culture, Gersch continued, different generations of Nazis work together.
Many of those who helped lead the 2018 riots came out of this city-based lineage. Among them was Hendrik Lasch, who in 2000 opened PC Records (Political Correctness, No Thanks!), which went on to become one of the most successful far-right music labels in Germany. Located in a quiet residential neighborhood, the recording and distribution company is closely connected to Backstreet Noise/Trend Conscious, a retail shop that sells clothing synonymous with a neonazi aesthetic. These images and brands are commonly seen throughout Saxony. This establishment has done so well that the owner has been able to purchase other buildings to start new neonazi projects, such as an annual neonazi Mixed Martial Arts event called Tiwaz.
PC Records came under sharp criticism when a song they recorded, “Döner Killer,” was featured in a video created by the National Socialist Underground (NSU), a terrorist organization responsible for killing 10 people—eight of them from Turkish backgrounds—between 2000 and 2007.[28] The NSU lived in hiding for 13 years, often in Chemnitz.[29]
Another aspect of social life greatly influenced by far-right politics today is hooligan soccer fan clubs.[30] Groups such as Kaotic Chemnitz and New Society, also known as “NS Boys,” are present in city life, and have been for a long time. Some members of NS Boys have said—or even stated publicly—that the disbanded club “HooNaRa,” or violent Hooligan-Nazis-Racists, from the 1990s, are their role models.[31] These politics reverberate around and within sports culture. The local soccer team, Chemnitzer FC, recently underwent a controversy where, before kick off, the stadium displayed the picture of Thomas Haller, a known neonazi and founder of HooNaRa, and some team officials and members, as well as fans, observed a moment of silence for his passing and a fireworks display.[32] This resulted in the team losing significant sponsorships. Later the team captain, Daniel Frahn, was fired for repeated, open support of neonazi groups.[33]
Near the soccer stadium, in the neighborhood of Sonnenberg, interactions with neonazis take on a different tone. Mostly a low-income and immigrant neighborhood, families from different racial backgrounds share common space in the central park, called Lessingplatz. Disputes are common, said one local reporter, yet there seems to be a shared agreement based on necessity. Syrian families will play on the swings, while so-called “table tennis neonazi families” enjoy the park tables. Still, this relative peace is demarcated by robust far-right infrastructure. Across the street from Lessingplatz is Power Games, a game store owned by a suspected neonazi that was raided in Saxony-wide investigations for weapons and evidence of supporting far-right terrorist activity.[34] Witnesses reported seeing illegal firearms, which later spurred a police raid—the second raid in a year. The store remains open today.
This level of far-right activism is enabled today by the willful ignorance of mainstream political parties like the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the governing party in Saxony, which has consistently denied the existence of a neonazi problem in the region.[35] Making matters worse, since the AfD gained seats in the national parliament in 2017, the CDU has consistently shifted rightward, attempting to recapture voters it lost to the far-right party.
The Aftermath
After the 2018 riots, Chemnitz police came under sharp criticism for failing to address far-right violence—whether due to incompetence or collusion. On the morning of the first PRO Chemnitz demonstration, the Verfassungsschutz, Germany’s secret service, sent notice to the Chemnitz police department, suggesting reinforcement, but the memo went ignored.
Later that week, Saxony’s Justice Ministry confirmed that a prison guard had photographed the arrest warrant for Yousif A. and Alaa S. A local journalist would report that an image of the same documents was sent to far-right chat groups.[36] PRO Chemnitz, PEGIDA, the local AfD chapter, and Jan Timke, a Bremen-based state councilor and prominent right-wing populist, circulated the warrant, and with it, the idea of Messermigranten or, “Knife Migrants”—a right-wing narrative that equates migrants with criminals. “When the state can’t protect its citizens anymore, the citizens take to the street and protect themselves,” wrote Markus Frohmaier, an AfD politician, on Twitter. “Today it is a citizen’s duty to stop the deadly ‘knife migration!’”[37] (This narrative is often coupled with the accusation that the Lügenpresse, or lying press, often misleads the public about the rate of criminal activity by migrants.)
“The police were derelict in their duties,” said Liz Fekete. “When state institutions collude with violence, it doesn’t have to mean that police officers are fascists directly. It could just mean that they are from the same milieu…[they] sit in pubs, have breakfast with relations from this mindset.” In this way, Fekete asserted, what happened in Chemnitz is not limited to Chemnitz.
For people living and working in the city, the riots had an immediate impact. Gersch recalled that throughout Chemnitz, “we had the impression that you don’t know what’s happening tomorrow [and that]… this region is changing and it could be a dangerous place to live.” For Leftists, LGBTQ, punk, and working class people, especially those who attended the counter-demonstrations, it was considered unsafe to return home after the riots.[38] Meanwhile, those perceived to be refugees or immigrants experienced an increase in assaults. André Löscher, a social worker with SUPPORT, which provides counseling to victims of right-wing violence, recalled that “Many people felt unsafe to go to the grocery store and children did not want to go to school.”[39]
At the same time, others chose to push back. Roughly a week after the violence, a free concert was organized by the local arts scene, with notable hip-hop and rock acts from across Germany banding together under the slogan, “There are more of us.”[40] “It was a hopeful moment because the city felt so different. The city center was small shops and stages, dancing on the streets, music playing, all these big bands, all these democratic and antifascist people, antifascist slogans were shouted, people were happy,” recalled Gersch. On stage, the lead singer of Kraftklub, a famous German band from Chemnitz, said, “We’re not naive. We’re not under the illusion that you hold a concert and then the world is saved, but sometimes it’s important to show that you’re not alone.”[41]
That message would prove to be true. “The city had a different feeling,” said Gersch. “But it didn’t stop the [far-right] demonstrations.” For the next three months, PRO Chemnitz organized weekly demonstrations, with similar anti-immigrant messaging as the riots, in order to build the far-right voting base ahead of an upcoming election.
Controversy also broke on the federal level after the riots. Although the Verfassungsschutz had warned Chemnitz police about the seriousness of the demonstrations, Hans-Georg Maassen, head of Germany’s domestic security agency, downplayed the violence that occurred, denying that far-right protestors had hunted refugees, despite credible video evidence.[42] Maassen was also criticized for giving information to AfD representatives before a federal investigation began into the party’s involvement in the riots.[43] Soon thereafter, he was forced to resign.[44] But this seemed to confirm a common criticism that Germany’s security departments are “blind in the right eye.”[45] Marco Wanderwitz, a former top official in the Federal Interior Ministry, admitted as much in Spiegel Online, noting, “We as the CDU in Saxony didn’t look closely at right wing extremism for many years and didn’t do enough about it.”[46] Some politicians in the Left party Die Linke, like Martina Renner, took it a step further to charge that the history of the Verfassungsschutz has always shown “sympathies for the extreme right, hatred against the left and disregard for the rule of law.”[47]
The media came under criticism too. Before the 2018 riots, local press often evoked right-wing narratives in covering refugee issues, rarely reported on right-wing activity, or else did so uncritically—all factors that helped pave the way for far-right networks to flourish. After Chemnitz, local activists saw a change in how media began to cover both subjects. Others, such as Johannes Grunert, a local reporter in Chemnitz, have written about the corresponding rise in anti-racist community building.[48]
But the threat remains. The riots and following weekly anti-refugee demonstrations created space for new neonazi organizations. In October 2018, police raided the homes of far-right activists in Chemnitz suspected of being members of a new terrorist cell, Revolution Chemnitz. Eight men were ultimately charged with planning an attack on immigrants in Berlin, which was set to take place on October 3, the anniversary of German reunification.[49]
On a more pedestrian level, there has been a sharp rise in everyday harassment, assaults, and provocation by people in far-right formations. In 2017, SUPPORT recorded 229 attacks in Saxony, many of which were race-related. In 2018, the number rose to 317, a 38 percent increase.[50] In Chemnitz alone, there were 20 incidents of far-right, violent, racist attacks in 2017; in 2018, there were 79. Notably, 64 of the 2018 attacks took place in the two months following the riots.
Many people, understandably, do not feel safe. “Some refugee and immigrant families are trying to move away from Saxony,” said SUPPORT’s André Löscher, although he noted that current migration laws restrict movement through residence requirements. While he said they’d been able to successfully get one family out of Chemnitz, more families are asking for help to leave.
While state-designated terrorist groups like Revolution Chemnitz pose a significant threat, many people in Chemnitz are equally concerned about the gains of the AfD in the September 2019 state elections. Kulturbüro Sachsen advisor Danilo Starosta believes that the riots illuminated the Far Right’s battle for control of the government. In Chemnitz, for the first time, he said, “the Alt Right outed itself…The softest critics of asylum policy were unifying with the heavy, well-organized Nazi scene. They were together in public, sharing a common language.”
That language, along with far-right culture and ideology, has become relatively normalized in Chemnitz, even as anti-racist and anti-fascist resistance contest their reach at every step. The neonazi networks from the 1990s either still exist, or have been replaced by new clubs and culture groups.
In the local elections in May 2019, AfD won three more seats on the city council, bringing the total to 11; PRO Chemnitz also gained a seat, for a current total of five.[51] These gains put them on par with the conservative CDU, meaning that if AfD and PRO Chemnitz form a coalition, they’ll outweigh the ruling party.
“We all thought that people would see now what kind of party the AfD is,” said Gersch, that “they are getting worse and more extreme.” Instead, many people believe that the riots actually increased their popularity.
In this September’s elections, the AfD gained again in state elections, becoming the second-strongest party in both Brandenburg and Saxony.[52] With 37 seats in the Saxony parliament, the AfD has increased access to state funding as well as influence on every committee, including investigations. While every other party has agreed not to work with them, the prospect of a far-right alliance in local and state governments seems likely.[53] And longtime anti-racist organizations working within Saxony, like SUPPORT and Courage, are bracing for new challenges, such as struggles around state funding as state committees may favor organizations less critical of the Far Right to do victim support or educational workshops in schools.
In August 2019, a court convicted 24-year-old Alaa S. of manslaughter and bodily harm in the death of Daniel Hillig—the initial spark that set off the riots. The charge comes with a sentence of nine-and-a-half years. Defense lawyers have already appealed the verdict, citing a lack of evidence.[54] But close to two years after the violence, the struggle over what Chemnitz means continues. Who determines which people belong in Chemnitz or what Chemnitz should stand for? Is Chemnitz, so hospitable to the Far Right, a lost cause, or worth fighting for? The battle over these questions continues even as the international press has moved on. For many Chemnitz residents who have decided to stay, knowing what you’re fighting for is just as important as knowing who you’re up against.
Endnotes
[1] Schmetterling was one of four restaurants attacked by far-right assailants in the months after the murder. The others included a Jewish restaurant called Schalom where, one day after the riots, assailants entered, destroyed property and hit the owner with bottles (https://www.dw.com/en/chemnitz-attack-on-jewish-restaurant-it-is-five-past-midnight/a-45421920). In October, an Iranian restaurant called Safran was attacked when three people wearing motorcycle helmets beat up the owner (https://iranwire.com/en/features/6296). Also in October, a Turkish restaurant called Mangal was set on fire (https://muslimnews.co.uk/news/islamophobia/germany-turkish-restaurant-targeted-xenophobic-attack/).
[2] “From the stands to the streets: What does Chemnitz violence have to do with football?” Deutsche Welle, August 28, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/from-the-stands-to-the-streets-what-does-chemnitz-violence-have-to-do-with-football/a-45258812.
[3] Melissa Eddy, “German Far Right and Counter Protestors Clash in Chemnitz,” The New York Times, April 28, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/world/europe/chemnitz-protest-germany.html.
[4] Ulli Jentsch, “Homegrown Terror Comes to Chemnitz,” September 6, 2018, apabiz archive, https://www.apabiz.de/2018/homegrown-terror-comes-to-chemnitz/; Mattias Bartsch, “Return of the Ugly German? The Riots in Chemnitz and Their Aftermath,” Spiegel International, August 18, 2018,
[5] Barbara Manthe, “Scenes from a ‘civil war’? Radical right narratives on Chemnitz,” Open Democracy, October 12, 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/scenes-of-civil-war-radical-right-narratives-on-chemnitz/.
[6] Kate Connolly, “Chemnitz riots spark calls for AfD to be put under surveillance,” The Guardian, September 4, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/04/chemnitz-riots-spark-call….
[7] Original interviews with author, July 23 and August 25, 2019.
[8] Ben Knight, “Chemnitz: Syrian asylum-seeker convicted of killing that sparked far-right riots,” Deutsche Welle, August 22, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/chemnitz-syrian-asylum-seeker-convicted-of-killin….
[9] Katrin Bennhold, “Chemnitz Protests Show New Strength of Germany’s Far Right,” The New York Times, August 30, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/world/europe/germany-neo-nazi-protests-chemnitz.html; J. Lester, Feder, “The Real Behind the Anti-Immigrant Riots Rocking Germany,” Buzzfeed News, August 31, 208, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/lesterfeder/germany-chemnitz-far-right-neo-nazis
[10] Liz Fekete, “Urgent Alert - Solidarity With the Victims of Far Right Violence in Saxony,” Institute for Race Relatlations, August 31, 2018, http://www.irr.org.uk/news/urgent-alert-solidarity-with-the-victims-of-far-right-violence-in-saxony/; (Original “Lasst uns zusammen zeigen wer in der Stadt das sagen hat!” https://twitter.com/idacampe/status/1033806354547437569); Matt Ford, “From the Stand to the Streets: What does Chemnitz violence Have to do with football?” Deutsche Welle, August 28, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/from-the-stands-to-the-streets-what-does-chemnitz-violence-have-to-do-with-football/a-45258812.
[11] Kate Connolly, “Chemnitz riots spark calls for AfD to be put under surveillance,” The Guardian, September 4, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/04/chemnitz-riots-spark-call….
[12] Ulli Jentsch, “Homegrown Terror Comes to Chemnitz,” September 6, 2018, apabiz archive, https://www.apabiz.de/2018/homegrown-terror-comes-to-chemnitz/
[13] Katrin Bennhold, “Chemnitz Protests Show New Strength of Germany’s Far Right,” The New York Times, August 30, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/world/europe/germany-neo-nazi-protests-chemnitz.html
[14] Griff Witte, “In Germany’s Chemnitz, extremists exploit a killing to take aim at refugees,” The Washington Post, August 30, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-germanys-chemnitz-extremists-exploit-a-killing-to-take-aim-at-refugees/2018/08/30/68e31aec-aacc-11e8-9a7d-cd30504ff902_story.html;
Citizen’s Movement PRO Chemnitz, “Share and participate” Facebook, August 26, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/prochemnitz/posts/2213944928647818.
[15] Ulli Jentsch, “Homegrown Terror Comes to Chemnitz,” September 6, 2018, apabiz archive, https://www.apabiz.de/2018/homegrown-terror-comes-to-chemnitz/; Mattias Bartsch, “Return of the Ugly German? The Riots in Chemnitz and Their Aftermath,” Spiegel International, August 18, 2018,
[16] Liz Fekete, “Urgent Alert - Solidarity With the Victims of Far Right Violence in Saxony,” Institute for Race Relatlations, August 31, 2018, http://www.irr.org.uk/news/urgent-alert-solidarity-with-the-victims-of-far-right-violence-in-saxony/; “Injured in right wing protests in Chemnitz,” Zeit, August 27, 2018, https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2018-08/gegendemonstration-chemnitz-sachsen-die-linke-rechte-gewalt (original Verletzte bei rechten Protesten in Chemnitz).
[17] Some representatives of the AfD made public statements trying to distance the party away from the Monday rally (https://www.dw.com/en/violence-in-chemnitz-as-leftist-and-far-right-pro…), even though a number of AfD politicians showed up.
[18] Jochen Bittner, “What Do Trump and Marx Have in Common?” The New York Times, October 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/opinion/what-do-trump-and-marx-have-in-common.html; Jefferson Chase, “Lessons from Chemnitz: Eastern Germany’s right-wing protestors awash in anxiety,” Deutsche Welle, September 2, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/lessons-from-chemnitz-eastern-germanys-right-wing-protesters-awash-in-anxiety/a-45326613.
[19] Original interview with author, July 9, 2019.
[20] Christoph Richter, “Lichtenhagen riots continue to haunt many,” Deutsche Welle, August 26, 2012, https://www.dw.com/en/lichtenhagen-riots-continue-to-haunt-many/a-16194604.
[21] Stephen Kinzer, A Wave of Attacks on Foreigners Stirs Shock in Germany,” The New York Times, October 1, 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/01/world/a-wave-of-attacks-on-foreigners-stirs-shock-in-germany.html; Albrecht Kieser, “May 28, 1992: Citizens anger against asylum center,” Neue Rheinische Zeitung, March 23, 2006, http://www.nrhz.de/flyer/beitrag.php?id=1582 (original 28. Mai 1992: Bürgerzorn vor Asylbewerberheim); Barbara Manthe, “Scenes from a ‘civil war’? Radical right narratives on Chemnitz,” Open Democracy, October 12, 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/scenes-of-civil-war-radical-right-narratives-on-chemnitz/.
[22] Hans-Edzard Busemann, “Merkel, heckled on visit to refugees, says no to xenophobia,” Reuters, August 26, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-merkel-idUSKCN0QV1LL20150826.
[23] Henrik Böhme, “Opinion: To understand Saxony, look at its history,” Deutsche Welle, August 31, 2018,
https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-to-understand-saxony-look-at-its-history/a-45312184.
[24] Original interview with author, August 12, 2019.
[25] Rainer Münz and Ralf E. Ulrich, “Changing Patterns of Immigration to Germany, 1945-1997,” UC Davis, https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rs/more.php?id=69.
[26] University of Hildesheim, “The Treuhandanstalt in the context of German unification,”
https://www.uni-hildesheim.de/no_cache/fb1/institute/geschichte/erasmus-und-europagespraeche/europa-gespraeche/sommersemester-2007/die-treuhandanstalt-im-kontext-der-deutschen-einigung/?sword_list=Einigung (original Die Treuhandanstalt im Kontext der deutschen Einigung).
[27] Sonya Angelica Diehn, “Neo-Nazis cloak themselves in eco-rhetoric,” Deutsche Welle, March 8, 2012, https://www.dw.com/en/neo-nazis-cloak-themselves-in-eco-rhetoric/a-15793310.
[28] Hilary Moore, “Anti-fascists won’t let Germany return to normal after weak verdict in neo-Nazi trial,” Waging Nonviolence, July 13, 2018, https://wagingnonviolence.org/2018/07/anti-fascists-germany-neo-nazi-nsu-trial/.
[29] Antonia von der Behrens, “The NSU-Case in Germany,” NSU Watch, March 8, 2017, https://www.nsu-watch.info/2017/03/the-nsu-case-in-germany/.
[30] Hooligans and hooliganism is a nuanced phenomenon. As Gabriel Kuhn, author of Soccer vs. The State (PM Press, 2019), described the landscape, originally, hooligans were violent “troublemakers,” not at all tied to football. There are violent football supporters who aren’t “hooligans”; some Ultras are violent, but there is a clear distinction between them and hooligan culture. Some hooligans self-define as such, others don’t, and certainly not everyone labeled a hooligan by the media is one. Lastly, while some hooligans are distinctly right-wing, many are explicitly non-political, and there are also “Antifa hooligans.”
[31] Steffan Dobbert, “The East German Football Province and the Right: Only the swastika is missing,” Jungle World, April 30, 2008, https://jungle.world/artikel/2008/18/nur-das-hakenkreuz-fehlt (original Nur das Hakenkreuz fehlt).
[32] Felix Tamsut, “Why was a Neo-Nazi hooligan mourned at a football game in Germany?” Deutsche Welle, March 14, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/why-was-a-neo-nazi-hooligan-mourned-at-a-football-game-in-germany/a-47856332.
[33] Emma Anderson, “German football club captain sacked over ‘sympathy’ for neo-Nazis,” Politico, August 5, 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/german-football-club-captain-sacked-neo….
[34] “Suspected terrorist again targeted by investigations,” Freie Presse, October 17, 2013, https://www.freiepresse.de/chemnitz/mutmasslicher-terror-helfer-erneut-im-visier-der-ermittler-artikel8570802; “Großrazzia! Waffen unterPC-Spielen versteckt?” Morgenpost, October 17, 2013, https://www.kinderfreundliche-sachsen.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Pressespiegel/Pressespiegel-Oskar-2013/Kinder-Oskar_fuer_die_nette_Zahnaerztin_von_nebenan_-_Mopo_Chemnitz_17.10.13.pdf.
[35]Oleg Burunov, “Social Democrats Accuse Merkel’s Party of Failing to Curtail Right-Wing Tendencies,” Sputnik News, December 19, 2019, https://sputniknews.com/europe/201912191077624449-angela-merkel-cdu-rig….
[36] “Prison guard admits to leaking Chemnitz arrest warrant,” Deutsche Welle, August 31, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/prison-guard-admits-to-leaking-chemnitz-arrest-warrant/a-45300402.
[37] Katrin Bennhold, “Chemnitz Protests Show New Strength of Germany’s Far Right,” The New York Times, August 30, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/world/europe/germany-neo-nazi-protests-chemnitz.html
[38] “Three victims of the right-wing attacks have filed a complaint,” Zeit, August 27, 2018, https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2018-08/chemnitz-sachsen-roland-woellner-innenminister-ausschreitungen-pressekonferenz (original Drei Opfer der rechten Übergriffe haben Anzeige erstattet).
[39] Original interview by author, August 25, 2019.
[40] “Chemnitz protests: Thousands attend free anti-racism concert,” BBC News, September 4, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45402005.
[41] “Chemnitz protests: Thousands attend free anti-racism concert,” BBC News, September 4, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45402005.
[42] Rick Noack and Luisa Beck, “German Spy Chief dismissed amidst row with Merkel over ‘fake’ video that wasn’t fake,” The Washington Post, September 18, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/09/18/german-chancellor-merkel-has-new-rival-with-powerful-supporters-her-own-spy-chief/; “No Information on the Hunt,” Bild, September 6, 2018, https://www.bild.de/bild-plus/politik/inland/politik-inland/verfassungsschutz-chef-maassen-keine-information-ueber-hetzjagden-57111216,view=conversionToLogin.bild.html (original Keine Information über Hetzjagden).
[43] Ben Knight, “German spy chief passed info to AfD: report,” Deutsche Welle, September 13, 2018,
https://www.dw.com/en/german-spy-chief-passed-info-to-afd-report/a-45472180.
[44] “Ex-spymaster Hans-Georg Maassen to become Seehofer adviser,” Deutsche Welle, September 23, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/ex-spymaster-hans-georg-maassen-to-become-seehofer-adviser/a-45610725.
[45] David Rising, “German leaders struggle to counter rise in right-wing hate,” Associated Press, February 22, 2020, https://eu.detroitnews.com/story/news/world/2020/02/22/germany-far-right-hate-shooting-violence/111363372/.
[46] Mattias Bartsch, “Return of the Ugly German? The Riots in Chemnitz and Their Aftermath,” Spiegel International, August 18, 2018,
[47] Sebastian Wehrahn and Martina Renner, “The problem of the protection of the constitution has a long history,” Netzpolitik, March 18, 2019, https://netzpolitik.org/2019/das-problem-verfassungsschutz-hat-eine-lange-geschichte/ (original Das Problem Verfassungsschutz hat eine lange Geschichte).
[48] Johannes Grunert, “The struggle of the Chemnitz,” Zeit, August 26, 2019,
https://blog.zeit.de/stoerungsmelder/2019/08/26/der-kampf-der-chemnitzer_28887 (original Der Kampf der Chemnitzer).
[49] Ben Knight, “German far-right terror suspects detained in overnight raids,” Deutsche Welle, October 1, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/german-far-right-terror-suspects-detained-in-overnight-raids/a-45706340; “Neo-Nazi ‘terrorist cell’ on trial over alleged Berlin attack plot,” The Guardian, September 30, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/30/neo-nazi-terrorist-cell-revolution-chemnitz-trial-germany.
[50] SUPPORT, “Right-wing motivated and racist violence in 2018,” March 7, 2019,
https://www.raa-sachsen.de/support/statistik (original Rechtsmotivierte und rassistische Gewalt in Sachen 2018).
[51] A Leipzig-based researcher said the local results on the official homepage of Chemnitz City Council are stated incorrectly, and that actually the AfD has 18.3 percent, not 5 percent, of seats.
[52] Elizabeth Schumacher, “Germany: AfD set for second spot in eastern elections,” Deutsche Welle, September 1, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/germany-afd-set-for-second-spot-in-eastern-elections/a-50249887.
[53] Every party in federal parliament has written a Beschlüsse, or party agreement stating that they will not work with the far-right party, AfD. For example, the SPD wrote, “At our annual kick-off meeting we therefore adopted the resolution ‘Consensus of the Democrats.’ We make it clear: Political majorities must not be achieved by votes of the AfD. We invite you and your local associations, (sub)districts, district and national associations to also discuss and adopt the resolution.” (https://www.spd.de/aktuelles/detail/news/wir-sind-das-bollwerk-der-demokratie/11/02/2020/. Translation by the author.)
[54] “Syrian convicted of Chemnitz killing that sparked far-right riots,” Aljazeera, August 23, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/syrian-convicted-chemnitz-killing-sparked-riots-190823072342490.html.