Liberal observers of global politics often describe Taiwan as Asia’s freest country.[i] Unlike many of its neighbors, Taiwan accords its citizens freedom of speech and assembly, as well as marriage equality, to name a few of the country’s rights and freedoms. They are palpable in daily life. I’ve observed Taiwanese taxi drivers openly share their lamentations about the lack of parking in the city and government corruption while indulging in right-wing speculations about “undeserving” people receiving government benefits. People gather throughout the island to protest domestic and international issues ranging from traffic penalty acts’ draft amendments to the Ukraine and Gaza wars. And every year, hundreds of thousands of LGBTQIA+ people and their allies march in the capital, Taipei, to celebrate Pride in the only country in Asia where same-sex unions are recognized and legal.
But modern Taiwan hasn’t always been viewed as Asia’s beacon of democracy. Taiwan, which was annexed by China’s Qing dynasty in the late 17th century, became a Japanese colony from 1895 through World War II, and for over 40 years, the country was ruled under a military dictatorship by the Kuomintang (KMT). It wasn’t until 1987 that then-president Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law.[ii] Taiwanese citizens have since fought hard to gain and maintain their rights. In the early 21st century, as Taiwan appeared to emerge as a democratic power, a democratic society was anything but guaranteed. Instead, the country’s political history reflects an ongoing struggle between authoritarianism and democracy.
The 2024 election cycle resurfaced the authoritarian threat that lurks within Taiwan’s democracy amid growing U.S.-China tensions. KMT leaders regarded the elections as an opportunity to win power when popular President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), after serving two terms, was no longer eligible to run. Like other authoritarian leaders around the world, the KMT relied on right-wing tactics, creating and disseminating disinformation to divide Taiwanese society. Their efforts have been aided by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which has leveraged to their advantage the KMT’s ambition to regain power.
Ahead of Taiwan’s 2024 elections, the CCP ramped up its propaganda machine to prop up KMT presidential candidates while undermining DPP candidates and policies. The KMT also plotted with the CCP to discredit independent media, spread misleading or inaccurate information through social media, and use narratives designed to engineer U.S. skepticism to steer the Taiwanese public away from a key geopolitical ally. The electoral results that followed such efforts were mixed: While the KMT won a one-seat majority in the legislature, the DPP secured a third consecutive term, with President-elect William Lai preparing to take office this May. But the KMT’s reckless quest for power amid Taiwan’s shifting politics indicates that Taiwan’s right-wing authoritarian past continues to haunt its democracy.
The Taiwanese Political Landscape
Taiwan is a self-ruled island with its own constitution, currency, and freely elected government. However, Beijing’s “One China” policy claims Taiwan as a renegade province of the Chinese state, wielding military and political pressure to force the island, as well as the global community, to accept its territorial claims. Beijing, which has prevented Taiwan from being recognized as an independent state, discourages formal diplomatic relations with the island-state and deters Taiwan’s participation in global institutions like the United Nations and World Health Organization. In recent years, Beijing has ramped up its rhetoric, asserting that China will not renounce the use of force to bring Taiwan to its fold, while claiming it prefers a more peaceful solution.[iii] This choice between peace and war is how the Chinese government framed Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election.[iv]
While Taiwan’s political landscape is not typically characterized as Left or Right, there are ideological and political differences between the two major parties.[v] Ahead of the recent election, the incumbent DPP promoted Taiwanese nationalism—based on a Taiwanese identity distinct from Chinese nationalism—and continued cultivating its relationship with the U.S. and the global community.[vi] The DPP is considered somewhat progressive, despite setting aside some of its social welfare promises to promote neoliberal economic growth. Founded in 1986, one year before martial law ended, the DPP emerged to challenge the prevailing political system and authoritarianism under the KMT.[vii] The party has traditionally embraced human rights advocacy and promoting Taiwanese identity, and includes LGBTQ rights, social welfare, and environmentalism in its platform.[viii]
Conversely, the right-wing, Chinese nationalist KMT makes socially conservative appeals to “traditional values,”[ix] including opposition to same-sex marriage, and supports closer ties with Taiwan’s powerful neighbor, China. The KMT’s official Chinese name, which translates to “China National People’s Party,”[x] signals the party’s ties to China and Chinese identity, which influence its current pro-China stance. However, the KMT and CCP were once adversaries and fought bitterly during the Chinese Civil War. After losing the war, the KMT retreated to Taiwan, believing they would one day defeat the Communist Party and “recover the mainland.”[xi] Meanwhile, they claimed to be the legitimate government of the Republic of China (ROC), which remains Taiwan’s official name, governing the island as a one-party state.[xii] After losing Taiwan’s second-ever election in 2000, the KMT has worked with the CCP to fight a new enemy-in-common: the DPP and Taiwanese nationalism.[xiii]
Taiwan’s political landscape can be broadly understood as two coalitions, the conservative “pan-blue” and the more liberal-left “pan-green.” Historically, the KMT has headed the pan-blue group, leading smaller right-leaning parties that are traditionally pro-reunification. In contrast, the pan-green group of the DPP and affiliated parties has favored Taiwanese independence and distance from China.[xiv] However, in recent years, the KMT has proclaimed support for Taiwan’s ambiguous status quo—effectively independent, though not formally—with many in the party rejecting immediate unification with China.[xv] Likewise, the DPP has softened its stance on independence and vocalized maintaining the status quo. The TPP, a new political party founded in 2019, campaigned on the slogan, “Put blue and green aside, and people in the middle”[xvi] and criticized both parties without taking a clear side on historically significant electoral issues, such as cross-strait relations and energy policies.[xvii] Despite this, the TPP finds solid support among Taiwanese youth disenfranchised by low salaries and high housing prices.[xviii]
Taiwan’s Authoritarian Era
When the KMT first governed Taiwan following the end of Japanese colonial rule after World War II, locals[xix] initially welcomed the newcomers.[xx] But economic mismanagement and the use of armed force against civilians spurred Taiwanese uprisings against the government, and in response, the KMT implemented martial law in 1949.[xxi] Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT’s leader at the time, justified the violent repression as necessary to weed out Communist infiltrators and ward off a potential invasion by the CCP’s armed wing, the People’s Liberation Army.[xxii]
With the help of his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, whom Chiang appointed as the head of the secret police, the KMT used arbitrary arrest and torture to control the Taiwanese populace and maintain a brutal dictatorship.[xxiii] During the White Terror Period[xxiv] from 1949 to 1992 the government imposed these violent, repressive measures on thousands of suspected leftists, those they suspected to be sympathetic toward the CCP, and Taiwanese locals and indigenous peoples[xxv] who participated in previous uprisings or were accused of criticizing the government. The KMT’s secret police arrested, interrogated, charged, tried, imprisoned, and executed thousands of people during the White Terror Period.[xxvi]
Chiang’s authoritarian policies were relaxed somewhat when Chiang Ching-kuo became his father’s successor in 1975. The younger Chiang upgraded Taiwan’s infrastructure, including constructing the national highway, an international airport, and a nuclear power plant.[xxvii] Under his leadership, Taiwan experienced rapid economic development, which became known as the Taiwan Miracle.[xxviii] In the 1980s, the Taiwanese government began to invest in capital-intensive and knowledge-based industries.[xxix] This included providing nearly half the start-up capital for TSMC, now the largest contract manufacturer of semiconductor chips powering the world’s phones, laptops, cars, and fridges.[xxx]
The Beginning of Taiwanese Democracy
Chiang Ching-kuo understood that the U.S. and other developed nations would see “democratic Taiwan” in a better light than Communist China.[xxxi] He introduced democratic reforms toward the end of his life. To start, he chose a local Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, as his deputy. Chiang tolerated political opposition in government, which eventually led to the DPP’s formation. He also lifted martial law in 1987, ending a reign of terror that lasted 38 years.[xxxii] When he died in 1988, his deputy, Lee, succeeded him as Taiwan’s president. Unlike his predecessor, Lee had no connection to China and cultivated a more independent, international image for Taiwan.[xxxiii] In 1996, when Taiwan held its first direct presidential election, Lee ran as a KMT candidate was the first president elected by Taiwanese citizens, defeating the candidate from the opposition DPP.
Four years later, though, the DPP won its first election in 2000 when the Taiwanese elected Chen Shui-bian as president.[xxxiv] Chen asserted Taiwan’s sovereignty and promoted Taiwanese identity by supporting Hokkien language use, which had been severely suppressed during martial law.[xxxv] However, Chen’s presidency was mired in corruption and scandal, and after two terms, Taiwanese people elected another KMT government, this time, under Ma Ying-jeou. Ma negotiated economic policies that brought Taiwan closer to Beijing, with short-lived improvements to Taiwan’s economy.[xxxvi] As economic pressures increased on Taiwan’s people, Ma’s popularity declined—particularly as he pushed forward bilateral Taiwan-China policies like the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) to reduce export tariffs, and the unpopular Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) to formalize existing business practices and lift trade restrictions.[xxxvii] Taiwanese students and civic groups worried that the agreement would benefit the wealthy and severely hurt the working class,[xxxviii] and also leave Taiwan vulnerable to Beijing’s political pressure.[xxxix] The Ma administration’s attempt to expedite the CSSTA’s review process led to public outcry and a dynamic protest movement: the Sunflower Movement.[xl]
Taiwanese Democracy in Action
The Sunflower Movement was a vital manifestation of Taiwanese democracy. On March 18, 2014, students and civic group members peacefully occupied the Legislative Yuan of Taiwan’s parliament to block the CSSTA’s ratification.[xli] The protesters initially sought a clause-by-clause review of the trade pact. However, they eventually demanded its rejection, along with passing legislation that allowed close monitoring of future agreements with China.[xlii] Five days after the occupation began, protesters entered the Executive Yuan, but within hours, hundreds of police officers were mobilized to evict them.[xliii]
Angered by this civil disobedience, the Ma administration ordered a crackdown that injured hundreds of people.[xliv] The authoritarian suppression of people’s voices was reminiscent of the White Terror era, prompting a backlash. As a result, the KMT’s trade agreements stalled; the Taiwanese legislature never ratified the CSSTA due to the students’ opposition and their impact on public opinion.[xlv] The Sunflower Movement birthed a new generation of Taiwanese activists opposing China’s increasing aggression and inspired other civil disobedience campaigns and democratic movements in Asia, including Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement later that year.[xlvi]
The nonviolent student movement and public support for it ushered in a new government in 2016, returning to power the DPP under President Tsai. She famously said that only Taiwan’s people can decide their future[xlvii] and legalized same-sex marriage in 2019.[xlviii] Tsai’s vice president and successor Lai Ching-te, also known as William Lai, has said he would continue President Tsai’s path of proffering talks with China and maintaining peace and the status quo while also pledging to defend the island.[xlix]
Discrediting the Media as a Disinformation Tactic
Ten years after the Sunflower Movement energized Taiwanese civil society, the country’s democracy faces a significant and growing threat: disinformation. Through “verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public,” as the European Commission defines it, disinformation systematically creates fear and confusion, “and may cause public harm.” [l] The CCP’s multi-pronged disinformation strategy pollutes Taiwan’s information ecosystem.
One effective and inexpensive right-wing disinformation tactic is to undermine credible sources of information, such as established news media and journalists. In Taiwan, the KMT attacked publications and journalists perceived as critical of its policies. Among them was Reuters Senior Correspondent Yimou Lee, over his work on China’s attempts to meddle with Taiwan’s elections. Throughout late 2023, after reviewing security documents and interviewing anonymous sources, Lee reported on Chinese government attempts to influence Taiwan’s 2024 elections. These efforts included sponsoring discounted trips to China for hundreds of Taiwanese politicians,[li] engaging folk religious groups in rural Taiwan to manipulate political opinion in its favor,[lii] and asking a popular Taiwanese rock band, Mayday, to make pro-China comments.[liii]
China’s Taiwan Affairs Office and pro-Beijing media rebuked Lee’s journalism. China’s Taiwan Affairs Office decried the Mayday story as “fake news” and DPP-spread rumors.[liv] Pan-blue, pro-China Taiwanese media United Daily News (UDN) and China Times published criticisms that described Lee’s use of anonymous sources as “unverifiable content” [lv] and his work as a ploy to extend the DPP agenda.[lvi]China Times reported a KMT press conference’s claim that Lee’s reporting stirred up “fake national security” issues by using anonymous sources and that the DPP interfered with the elections through foreign media.[lvii] Though the pan-blue camp’s efforts failed to discredit Lee’s watchdog journalism, their schemes signal what’s to come if the KMT wins the presidency in a future election.
Harnessing Social Media to Spread Disinformation
The CCP repeatedly targets Taiwanese audiences on social media to manipulate Taiwan’s political conversation.[lviii] Before and during the 2024 election cycle, Chinese online influence operations disseminated videos and memes about Taiwanese political parties across Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok to undermine the DPP’s governance.[lix] Numerous China-affiliated “content farms” operate in Taiwan, producing massive amounts of low-quality news articles to collect money from page clicks and influence Taiwanese public opinion.[lx] Beijing’s strategy has proved fruitful. When people share information that confirms their existing biases with little regard for its veracity, disinformation spreads, distorting public discourse and undermining democratic decision-making.[lxi]
Disinformation spread through local news and social media often blows mundane issues out of proportion to create panic, fear, and confusion. In early 2023, Taiwanese news reported an egg shortage. The news went viral on social media, leading to panic buying and hoarding.[lxii] However, anti-disinformation researchers found an atypical pattern in online discussions of the egg shortage leading up to the election, suggesting a disinformation campaign about the causes of the shortage.[lxiii] One man’s photos of eggs that appeared to be tainted with black and green mold turned out to be doctored.[lxiv] An agricultural blogger said he received death threats for writing about the government’s egg-import program, later found to be a hoax orchestrated with the help of a KMT staffer.[lxv] The overblown egg-shortage controversy painted a narrative of DPP incompetence and chaos, leading some to believe the government couldn’t secure essential food items.
“U.S. Skepticism” as Disinformation
With Taiwan-U.S. relations growing stronger in recent years, China’s disinformation strategy has focused increasingly on spreading manipulative “U.S. Skepticism” narratives. According to Taiwan Information Environment Research Center (IORG), such narratives imply that U.S. support would be catastrophic for Taiwan by selectively wielding critiques of U.S. global power and actions to present the U.S. as a fake friend that will abandon, weaken, and eventually destroy Taiwan.[lxvi] Instead, these narratives invoke a shared language and ethnicity to suggest that Taiwan should depend on China, its real family, for support.[lxvii] Like other content meant to influence Taiwanese public opinion, the CCP plants U.S. skepticism in its official media and distributes it through content farms and social media.
China’s U.S. Skepticism strategy intensified after the Russia-Ukraine war began in 2022. Many people in Taiwan, watching a large and powerful country invade its smaller neighbor, have been concerned about their safety in case of a Chinese invasion. As IORG research confirms, the CCP circulated anti-U.S. narratives concerning the war to stoke fear and divide Taiwanese society.[lxviii] For instance, in reporting on President Biden saying that he would not send troops to Ukraine, China’s state-controlled China Taiwan Network wrote, “The United States will also abandon Taiwan,”[lxix] implying that the U.S. would not aid Taiwan during a cross-strait crisis.[lxx] The message was shared widely on social media, along with statements like “Ukraine today; Taiwan tomorrow,” and “The United States uses Taiwan as a pawn.”[lxxi] Through such information manipulation, China encourages mistrust of Taiwan’s democratic governance—and ultimately aims to absorb it.
Along with amplifying fears of war and destruction, the CCP fueled U.S. skepticism by accusing the DPP government of conspiring with the U.S. to “sell out [the] people of Taiwan.” TSMC, mentioned before as a supplier of high-end microchips, is considered the pride of Taiwan. In 2020, amid public discussion of the possibility of establishing a U.S.-based TSMC factory, a facility in Arizona was announced.[lxxii] As efforts to set up the new plant progressed, China’s Voice of the Strait published a June 2022 report arguing that the U.S.’s strategic goal is to “use Taiwan to contain China.”[lxxiii] With the cooperation of the DPP government, they alleged, requiring TSMC to set up factories in the U.S. is “the first step to hollowing out Taiwan.”[lxxiv]
While the CCP sowed distrust of the U.S. during Taiwan’s 2024 election cycle, the KMT took advantage of the resulting political confusion to advance its campaign for closer ties with China. For example, the 2024 KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-Ih proposed renegotiating the cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), which stalled during Tsai Ing-wen’s administration. Hou’s push to revive trade policies that had been rejected by the Taiwanese public demonstrated the KMT’s unwillingness to listen to the people it supposedly serves, indicating an alarming authoritarian direction in its governance.
Taiwan’s 2024 Election Results—And What They Mean
On January 13, 2024, Taiwan held nationwide elections. Vice President William Lai of the DPP prevailed in the three-way presidential election and took office in May.[lxxv] Although the Chinese government framed Lai as a dangerous separatist, Taiwanese voters gave the DPP a third consecutive victory.[lxxvi] However, they also gave the KMT, which now controls 52 seats to the DPP’s 51, a narrow majority in the legislature.[lxxvii]
The 2024 election results are a warning from voters that maintaining power based on a cross-strait status quo is no longer enough.[lxxviii] They indicate that although Taiwanese voters favor the DPP’s cross-strait policy, they want social change within their borders. During its eight years in power, the DPP failed to convince voters that it could address domestic issues, such as low wages, unaffordable housing, and Taiwan’s non-nuclear energy security challenges.[lxxix] The party faces an uphill battle to govern without a legislative majority.
Clearly, the DPP’s presidential win will not safeguard Taiwan’s precarious democracy from the CCP and KMT’s disinformation campaigns. If the DPP fails to address urgent economic and environmental concerns, Taiwanese voters may very well be seduced by its opponents in the next election cycle. This is a terrifying prospect, especially in an era of rampant disinformation, as the KMT—and with it, the country—has not fully reconciled the right-wing authoritarian past that seeps into its present.
Though its political future is uncertain, Taiwan is not consigned to a gloomy fate. Recognizing that an informed and critical populace is a pillar of a democratic society, fact-checking and investigative organizations, such as Taiwan FactCheck Center[lxxx], the IORG[lxxxi], The Reporter[lxxxii], and Taiwan AI Labs[lxxxiii] are working hard to declutter Taiwan’s information ecosystem. It’s up to Taiwan’s citizens to follow their lead and take seriously the threat of disinformation to their hard-won democracy and its movements for social justice.
Endnotes
[i] “2024 Taiwan Country Report,” Freedom House, 2024, https://freedomhouse.org/country/taiwan/freedom-world/2024.
[ii] Gerrit van der Wees, “Taiwan: The Facts of History Versus Beijing’s Myths,” Council on Geostrategy, January 8, 2024, https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/research/taiwan-the-facts-of-history-ver…, for a geopolitical overview of this history.
[iii] Yew Lun Tian and Ben Blanchard, “China Will Never Renounce Right to Use Force over Taiwan, Xi Says,” Reuters, October 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/xi-china-will-never-renounce-right-….
[iv] Yimou Lee and Ben Blanchard, “Taiwan to Vote in What China Calls ‘Peace and War’ Election,” Reuters, January 10, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-vote-what-china-calls….
[v] Yi-ching Hsiao, Su-feng Cheng, and Christopher H. Achen, “Political Left and Right in Taiwan,” in The Taiwan Voter, New Comparative Politics (The University of Michigan Press, 2017), 198–222, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvndv9z7.12?seq=1. for a longer discussion of Taiwan’s political landscape.
[vi] “Party Platform,” Democratic Progressive Party, https://www.dpp.org.tw/en/upload/download/Party_Platform.pdf.
[vii] Minfan Yu, “The Democratic Progressive Party’s Nuclear Policy Dilemma: An Unwavering Anti-Nuclear Stance Admist Self-Contradictory Policies,” Taiwan Insight, October 4, 2023, https://taiwaninsight.org/2023/10/04/the-democratic-progressive-partys-….
[viii] Democratic Progressive Party, “Party Platform.”
[ix] Enescan Lorci, “The KMT’s High-Stakes Gamble: Reaching the Pinnacle or Navigating a Precipice?” Global Taiwan Institute, October 4, 2023, https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/10/the-kmts-high-stakes-gamble-reaching-t….
[x] This is a literal translation, as the party’s name is typically rendered in English as Chinese Nationalist Party.
[xi] Gerrit van der Wees, “Has Taiwan Always Been a Part of China?,” The Diplomat, December 1, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/has-taiwan-always-been-part-of-china/.
[xii] Pradeek Krishna, “Kuomintang Through the Ages,” Taiwan Insight, December 20, 2022, https://taiwaninsight.org/2022/12/20/kuomintang-through-the-ages/, for an in-depth history of Kuomintang and the ROC; “History,” Government Portal of the Republic of China (ROC), 2024, https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_3.php, for the government’s version of this history.
[xiii] Amber Lin, “Taiwan’s Kuomintang at a Crossroads: Should the Nationalist Rethink Its China-Leaning Posture?,” trans. Guo Chen, The Reporter, June 24, 2020, https://www.twreporter.org/a/kmt-china-relationship-crossroad-english.
[xiv] Jieh-min Wu, “Taiwan: The Paradox of Preserving the Status Quo,” The Diplomat, November 15, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/11/taiwan-the-paradox-of-preserving-the-st….
[xv] Wu, “Taiwan.” Understood broadly as de facto independence, Taiwan’s status quo is subject to many complex political interpretations. Though both parties now officially claim to be pro-status quo, they argue often about issues of sovereignty.
[xvi] Milo Hsieh, “Despite Tsai’s Victory, Nationalism and Populism Are Still Strong in Taiwan,” Taiwan Insight, January 20, 2022, https://taiwaninsight.org/2020/01/22/despite-tsais-victory-nationalism-…. The TPP was founded by former doctor and Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je in 2019. Critics claim it’s a populist party that used social media to build a following.
[xvii] Hsieh, “Despite Tsai’s Victory.”
[xviii] Brian Hioe, “Taiwan’s DPP Wins Presidency, Falls Short in Legislature,” The Diplomat, January 14, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/01/taiwans-dpp-wins-presidency-falls-short….
[xix] Takefumi Hayada, “The Complexity of the Taiwanese,” Taipei Times, August 18, 2000, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2000/08/18/0000048…. Local Taiwanese refers to the benshengren: the Hokkien and Hakka-speaking people who migrated from China before or during Japanese colonization. Post-WWII migrants who arrived with the KMT are known as waishengren who predominately identified as “Chinese.” Though less prevalent today, the distinction remains essential in understanding the difference between the KMT and DPP’s stances.
[xx] Chih-Huei Huang, “The Transformation of Taiwanese Attitudes towards Japan in the Post-Colonial Period,” in Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1995-1945 (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 296–314, especially 298–99, https://idv.sinica.edu.tw/etwisdom/2009Web/PDF/ethch-0051b.pdf.
[xxi] Huang, “The Transformation of Tawianese Attitudes,” 309.
[xxii] Richard C. Kagan, “Martial Law in Taiwan,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 14, no. 3 (1982): 48–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.1982.10412657.
[xxiii] Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son Chiang Ching-Kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan (Harvard University Press, 2009), https://www.google.com.tw/books/edition/The_Generalissimo_s_Son/_5R2fnV….
[xxiv] Tze-wu Chang, “The Graveyard At The Center Of Taiwan’s White Terror Period,” trans. Harrison Chen, The Reporter, February 24, 2016, https://www.twreporter.org/a/white-terror-liuzhangli-english. The term “White Terror” has roots in the French Revolution, referring to the right-wing reprisal of the House of Bourbon’s supporters (who wore white) against the Jacobins. The term was later broadened to describe suppression against left-wing Communists.
[xxv] James Rogerson, “A Vibrant Celebration of Taiwan’s Little-Known Original Inhabitants,” BBC Travel, January 26, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/travel/article/20240125-a-vibrant-celebration-of-ta….
[xxvi] John C. Copper, “Economy of Taiwan,” Britannica, March 12, 2024, https://www.britannica.com/place/Taiwan/Economy.
[xxvii] Matthew Fulco, “Constructing Taiwan’s Future,” Taiwan Business Topics, February 16, 2018, https://topics.amcham.com.tw/2018/02/constructing-taiwans-future/; K.T. Li, “Contributions of the Ten Projects,” Taiwan Today, May 1, 1978, https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?post=13463&unit=8,8,29,32,32,45.
[xxviii] Been-lon Chen, “Inside the Taiwan Miracle,” Taiwan Today, June 1, 2011, https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?post=13965&unit=8,8,29,32,32,45.
[xxix] Copper, “Economy of Taiwan.”
[xxx] Chris Miller, Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology, (Scribner, 2022), https://books.google.com.tw/books?id=JxpdEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA167&redir_esc=y#…; Lawrence Wintermeyer, “The Chip Company In Taiwan You’ve Never Heard Of That Powers The Devices In Your Life —TSMC,” Forbes, August 5, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lawrencewintermeyer/2022/08/05/the-chip-co….
[xxxi] Hengjun Yang, “Chiang Ching-Kuo, China’s Democratic Pioneer,” The Diplomat, December 10, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/chiang-ching-kuo-chinas-democratic-pion….
[xxxii] Kagan, “Martial Law in Taiwan.”
[xxxiii] Patrick E. Tyler, “Taiwan’s Leader Wins Its Election and a Mandate,” The New York Times, March 24, 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/24/world/taiwan-s-leader-wins-its-elect….
[xxxiv] “Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),” in Encyclopedia Britannica, January 29, 2024, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Democratic-Progressive-Party-political….
[xxxv] Henning Klöter, “Language Policy in the KMT and DPP Eras,” China Perspectives 56 (2004), https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.442.
[xxxvi] Copper, “Economy of Taiwan.”
[xxxvii] Yu-jie Liao, “Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement: Accept or Forgo?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, China Power Project (blog), December 22, 2023, https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/taiwans-cross-strait-s….
[xxxviii] Yu-jie Liao, “Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement.”
[xxxix] Yu-yun Hsieh and Moira Weigel, “324: Dispatches from Taipei,” n+1, March 27, 2014, https://www.nplusonemag.com/online-only/foreign-affairs/324-dispatches-….
[xl] J. Michael Cole, “Taiwanese Occupy Legislature Over China Pact,” The Diplomat, March 20, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/taiwanese-occupy-legislature-over-china….
[xli] Hsieh and Weigel, “324: Dispatches from Taipei.” Media termed the occupation the “Sunflower Student Movement” after protesters woke to find a box of sunflowers and decorated the police’s barbed-wire gates and barricades with the flowers.
[xlii] Ying-yu Tseng, Ku Chuan, and Elaine Hou, “Protesters Lay Out Demands, Vow to Continue Occupation of Legislature,” Focus Taiwan, March 23, 2014, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/201403230011.
[xliii] Leon N. Kunz, “The Public Nature of Civil Disobedience: Lessons from the Sunflower and Umbrella Movement,” Taiwan Insight, May 21, 2021, https://taiwaninsight.org/2021/05/24/the-public-nature-of-civil-disobed….
[xliv] Hsieh and Weigel, “324: Dispatches from Taipei.”
[xlv] Crystal Hus, “Trade Pact Siege: Majority Opposes Trade Agreement: Poll,” Taipei Times, March 27, 2014, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/03/27/2003586647.
[xlvi] Helen Davidson, “How the Sunflower Movement Birthed a Generation Determined to Protect Taiwan,” The Guardian, March 20, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world./2024/mar/21/what-is-taiwan-sunflower…; and Kayo Chang Black, “Old Hong Kong, New China,” Consequence, 2023, for more information about Asia’s disobedience campaigns.
[xlvii] “Taiwan Election: How It Works,” Reuters, January 13, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/factbox-how-does-taiwan-elec….
[xlviii] Julia Hollingsworth, “Taiwan Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage in Historic First for Asia,” CNN, May 17, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/17/asia/taiwan-same-sex-marriage-intl/i….
[xlix] Ben Blanchard, “Lai Ching-Te, Taiwan’s New President-Elect, Will Face China’s Ire,” Reuters, January 13, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-president-elect-lai-face-chi….
[l] “Action Plan against Disinformation” (Brussels: European Commission, 2018), https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/action_plan_against_disi…, 1.
[li] Yimou Lee, “Exclusive: China Lures Hundreds of Taiwan Politicians with Cheap Trips Before Election,” Reuters, December 1, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-lures-hundreds-taiwan-….
[lii] James Pomfret and Yimou Lee, “China Wields Mazu ‘Peace Goddess’ Religion as Weapon in Taiwan Election,” Reuters, December 21, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-wields-peace-goddess-r….
[liii] Yimou Lee, “China Pressures Influential Taiwanese Band Ahead of Elections, Sources Say,” Reuters, December 28, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-pressures-influential-….
[liv] Lee, “China Pressures Influential Taiwanese Band.”
[lv] “United Daily News Editorial/Mayday Incident: National Security’s Cognitive Operations as Election Opposition [聯合報社論/五月天事件:國安當選舉奧步的認知作戰],” United Daily News, December 31, 2023, https://udn.com/news/story/7338/7676737
[lvi] Wen-ru 蔡雯如 Tsai and Zong-ying 蔡宗穎 Tsai, “The Kuomintang Revealed That National Security Personnel Repeatedly Told ‘This’ Foreign Media Reporter! Honglu Uses Mayday Cognitive Operations[國民黨爆國安人員屢放話給「這位」外媒記者!轟綠藉五月天認知作戰],” China Times, January 3, 2024, https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20240103001924-260407?chdtv.
[lvii] Tsai and Tsai, “The Kuomintang Revealed.”
[lviii] “Graphika Report: Agitate the Debate” (Graphika, December 2023), https://public-assets.graphika.com/reports/graphika-report-agitate-the-….
[lix] “Graphika Report: Agitate the Debate.”
[lx] William Kung, “Uncovering the Money and China Factor Behind ‘Mission’ – Taiwan’s Most Controversial Content Farm,” trans. Aaron Wytze Wilson, The Reporter, December 26, 2019, https://www.twreporter.org/a/information-warfare-business-content-farm-…. On content farms operating in Taiwan.
[lxi] David Ardia et al., “Addressing the Decline of Local News, Rise of Platforms, and Spread of Mis- and Disinformation Online” (Center for Information, Technology, and Public Life, n.d.), https://citap.unc.edu/news/local-news-platforms-mis-disinformation/.
[lxii] Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, “Taiwan’s Egg Import Controversy Reveals Cracks in Government Oversight,” October 23, 2023, https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/taiwans-egg-import-controversy-r….
[lxiii] “Taiwan Agriculture Chief Apologizes for Egg Shortage, Announces Plan to Import from Australia,” Canada–Asia Sustainability Tracker, February 23, 2023, https://cast.asiapacific.ca/map/event/2339.
[lxiv] Ching-ho Liu and Jason Pan, “Police Questions Man Sharing ‘Green Egg’ Photo,” Taipei Times, September 23, 2023, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/09/29/2003806954.
[lxv] Jui-chi Wu and Hsin-yin Lee, “Egg-Import Whistleblower Detained Over Fake Threats,” Focus Taiwan, October 8, 2023, https://focustaiwan.tw/society/202310080009.
[lxvi] Chihhao Yu, “US Skepticism Narratives and Where They Come From” Taiwan Information Environment Research Center [IORG], November 8, 2023, https://iorg.tw/_en/a/us-skepticism-238; IORG, “Withdrawal of the United States troops from Afghanistan: Taiwanese People Concerned, and the Chinese Communist Party’s official Media Took over to Spread U.S. Skepticism. [8 月阿富汗出大事:台灣民間發起、中共官媒接棒,另類「官民」協力傳播「疑美論」],” IORG, November 7, 2023, https://iorg.tw/da/11. Taiwanese people grew concerned about news about the U.S. withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and the CCP used this fear to advance the narrative that the U.S. will abandon Taiwan.
[lxvii] Yu, “US Skepticism Narratives and Where They Come From” for more examples of Taiwan’s U.S. Skepticism narratives.
[lxviii] “Information Manipulation in the Russia-Ukraine War: Criticizing Ukraine, Criticizing the United States, Supporting Russia, and Abandoning Taiwan [俄烏戰爭下的資訊操弄:批烏、批美、挺俄、棄台],” IORG, February 28, 2022, https://iorg.tw/da/21.
[lxix] “Information Manipulation in the Russia-Ukraine War.”
[lxx] China Taiwan Network, “Biden Ordered Not to Send Troops to Ukraine to Fight Russia. When People on the Island Panic About ‘Military Reunification’, the United States Will Also Abandon Taiwan. [拜登下令绝不派兵到乌克兰与俄罗斯作战 岛内恐慌‘武统’时美国会同样抛弃台湾],” China Taiwan Network, February 24, 2022, http://www.taiwan.cn/taiwan/jsxw/202202/t20220224_12409571.htm.
[lxxi] “Information Manipulation in the Russia-Ukraine War.”
[lxxii] Viola Zhou, “TSMC’s Debacle in the American Desert,” Rest of the World, April 23, 2024, https://restofworld.org/2024/tsmc-arizona-expansion/. TSMC has invested billions of dollars in an Arizona facility that was slated to open in 2024 as its first U.S. site, which led to the political controversy, but the plant has encountered delays and has not begun production.
[lxxiii] “About TSMC: Combined with War Anxiety, the Theory of US Skepticism Evolves Again [關於台積電:結合戰爭焦慮,疑美論再進化],” IORG, December 27, 2022, https://iorg.tw/da/37.
[lxxiv] “About TSMC: Combined with War Anxiety.”
[lxxv] John Dotson and Ben Levine, “The Outcomes of Taiwan’s 2024 Legislative Elections,” Global Taiwan Institute, January 24, 2024, https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/01/the-outcomes-of-taiwans-2024-legislati….
[lxxvi] Hioe, “Taiwan’s DPP Wins Presidency, Falls Short in Legislature.”
[lxxvii] Dotson and Levine, “The Outcomes of Taiwan’s 2024 Legislative Elections.” The remaining seats went to the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and independents likely to caucus with the KMT, holding 8 and 2, respectively. Overall, the DPP lost 10 seats, the KMT gained 14, and the TPP gained 3 seats.
[lxxviii] Hioe, “Taiwan’s DPP Wins Presidency, Falls Short in Legislature.” It was only during 2016–2024 that a non-KMT party has ever held a majority in the Taiwanese legislature. Hioe notes that the close results—a difference of one seat—could allow a third party like the TPP to hold the balance of power.
[lxxix] Joseph Webster, “Does Taiwan’s Massive Reliance on Energy Imports Put Its Security at Risk?,” Atlantic Council, New Atlanticist (blog), July 7, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/does-taiwans-mass….
[lxxx] Taiwan FactCheck Center, “About Us,” https://tfc-taiwan.org.tw/en/about-us.
[lxxxi] IORG, “About,” https://iorg.tw/_en/about.
[lxxxii] The Reporter, “About Us,” https://www.twreporter.org/about-us.
[lxxxiii] Taiwan AI Labs, “About Us,” https://ailabs.tw/about-us/.